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 5 
Introduction 
This short discussion paper is a cross section or a thematic summary of a consid-
erably longer work. The limited scope of the Discussion Papers series does not 
allow lengthy, detailed explanations or extensive references, only the presentation 
of mainly summarizing statements. In spite of the ensuing vulnerability, I did not 
refrain from the publication of my ideas in this form, hoping that they will become 
accessible to a wider readership in this way and the positive of negative feedback 
received will help me improve or further elaborate my theory. 
Hungary abandoned the practice of the former ‘socialist’ type planning in the 
early 1990s and even wound up the institutions related to it, but the development of 
a new planning system seems to take a longer time than expected. I believe that in 
a situation like this the best thing we can do to assist practice is to offer a sound 
theoretical foundation. A general theory can not only lead to a better understanding 
of the gist and possible forms of planning but can also serve as a basis for a con-
tinuously developing methodology of learning and rationalization. My purpose is 
to foster changes in attitudes to planning and to develop a new philosophy of plan-
ning with emphasis on teleology. I also intend to raise awareness concerning the 
limitations we have to face in the exploration of a given situation, and replace fal-
lacies about the unknown reality with desirable and accepted visions. My approach 
suggests that proper methodical thinking and action will make it possible for us to 
control our own life on condition that we fully realize our limitations, and do not 
pretend to be unquestionably objective in cases when the majority of our state-
ments cannot be verified. 
Jujol, one of Gaudi’s colleagues, who contributed to the final shape of the 
unique buildings created by the great Spanish architect, had a very special 
technique: he not only used the traditional materials in unusual ways but made use 
of objects that others would throw away and by doing so he gave a new 
interpretation of the components used and created works of great originality. With 
considerably less determination and hope I have also revived and re-interpreted 
ideas and have taken over – or vulgarised for the sake of practical work – time-
honoured arguments in order to use them as components of ‘some kind of planning 
theory’.  
The paper does not contain the traditional presentation or description of theories 
developed by other experts, and the reason is not only the limited scope. I believe 
that understanding what we read means interpreting it at the same time therefore I 
have incorporated the views of others in my theory of planning after filtering them 
through my own viewpoints and intentions. References to empirical works or case 
studies are also missing in spite of the 25 years’ experience I have accumulated as 
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a planner. I also deliberately rejected the approach of empirical sociology, i.e. the 
description of events occurring in a given context.  
The approach I use is basically post-positive; in general I prefer the normative 
approach, but in the case of some specific elements of planning I am prepared to 
accept the conventional efforts for verification. 
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1 What is the general theory of public planning 
concerned with? 
The general theory of planning is one of the practice-oriented social sciences, con-
cerned with the possibility, ways and processes we have to actively shape our fu-
ture instead of passively enduring what life may bring or being satisfied with sim-
ple, ad hoc actions. It also provides guidance about the possible interpretations of 
events in the past and present or the tools allowing the management of future 
events. 
The substantive theory (theory of planning) seeks to explain the essence of 
teleological action and to give a better understanding of planning itself. It also 
helps planners to identify the interpretation (belief/paradigm/theory) that is most 
easily compatible with their views, most suitable for the object of planning and is – 
at the same time – capable of increasing awareness and strengthening planners’ 
commitment. The procedural theory (theory in planning), focusing more on the 
practice of planning, describes the various phases and techniques used in designing 
the future, clarifies the role of planners and other actors involved, and recommends 
various tools for the solution of the problems/tasks. Institution-oriented approaches 
are closely related to the latter, putting the norms influencing the planning process, 
the legal regulation of the process and the development of the institutional frame-
work of planning in the focus of interest. Legal institutionalisation alone can guar-
antee that the accepted norms are observed and consensus is maintained. There are 
several arguments for the distinction of the above three approaches but I believe, 
that such a disjunction actually conceals the main point, namely that these different 
approaches represent the essential facets and specific manifestations of the same 
notion, that is the process of designing the future (planning).  
The general theory of planning which integrates the various possible ap-
proaches (‘meta-planning’) is concerned with the fundamental issues of planning, 
its conceptual system, their explanation and the general methodological questions 
(axiomatic framework). It formulates comprehensive statements at the highest level 
of abstraction. With a more practice oriented approach it can be defined as the gen-
eral theoretical framework, model and methodology of planning. In the latter sense 
it can be interpreted as meta-planning in constant transformation, capable of inte-
grating the ever occurring changes. It formulates general assumptions (‘meta-crite-
ria’) that become more concrete in the course of practical application after further 
input (scientific findings, choice of values) and allow personal interpretations as 
well. It represents a level of generalization where the anomalies arising in the 
course of application cannot make it refutable; on the contrary, they serve as prece-
dents strengthening the theory with their quasi-empirical content.  
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It is more and more widely accepted that there is no single theory or method 
that has proved better than the others in a historical perspective. We could only 
have a chance to create some kind of a comprehensive general theory if it were 
possible to grasp the formation of the meta-theory and methodology of planning as 
a process, the totality of the various theories as well as to provide it with the ability 
of adaptation and self-development. This presupposes the concomitance or the 
plural stock of the various theories and the existence of permeability, interaction 
and points of contact among them.  
It would be hard to avoid incorporating the various theories and methodologies 
into my work, or defining their relationship to the general theory. The classification 
that I am going to describe later on makes a distinction between substantial theo-
ries (theories of planning) and procedural theories (theories in planning). (This 
distinction and the terms used are taken from Faludi’s work (1973), although I need 
to point out that there are differences in our understanding of what they mean.) 
There is no general agreement in literature about their interpretation or their rela-
tionship and the existence of the various ‘schools’ makes the situation even more 
confusing. It is, however, more important to emphasize the common features of the 
two sub-systems rather than the differences between them. The practical applica-
tion of substantial theories presupposes the clarification of the various roles and the 
process itself, while the methodological approaches focusing on the process should 
also clarify the theoretical foundation.  
Theories of planning tend to be influenced by philosophy, while theories in 
planning are more exposed to the impact of sociology. The basic cases of (substan-
tial) planning theories seek to answer the general, fundamental questions of plan-
ning, like ‘Should we, or can we make plans in the given situation?’ or ‘What kind 
of rationality can replace the missing methodology of transcending?’ The answers 
provided by social philosophy serve as a guideline for planners in solving their 
own dilemmas. The various approaches in planning theory draw on different phi-
losophies or paradigms, their formation being primarily influenced by the devel-
opment of social philosophy, and determined by the ‘Zeitgeist’, i.e. the social con-
text in the broad sense of the term. These issues should be the concern of planning 
philosophy in the first place. Every theory of planning is embedded in a normative, 
historical and social context at the same time. The planner cannot consider himself 
well prepared for all kinds of planning situation without being familiar with several 
theories, including the recommendations for their application or their potential 
‘side effects’. 
After choosing the planning philosophy (planning theory) he is to apply, the 
committed planner also has to decide how to do the planning, how to build up the 
system and implement the process. In doing so he can rely on the (procedural) 
theories in planning that contribute to the clarification of the system of planning, 
the specific conditions in which planning takes place as well as the procedure. 
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They differ only in ‘style’ i.e. the methods recommended – providing a kind of 
theory of planning methodology. Its application in practical work will help plan-
ners to understand the environment in which they operate. Theories in planning are 
always directly influenced by the prevailing power relations and the current politi-
cal contents and this defines the role of public planning within the governance, the 
way it is used as a tool. The system of planning will be developed and regulated 
accordingly.  
Planners can be given various assignments or they can undertake various roles 
after assessing and analysing the actual situation. Depending on the type of chosen 
or given (highly regulated) planning role, I make a fundamental distinction be-
tween allocative, innovative and radical planning, each representing, at the same 
time, a choice of planning theory and methodology.  
Consequently, a general theory comprising all these approaches can assist not 
only in making conscious choices concerning the philosophy of planning (i.e. un-
derstanding the essence of planning) but in the adequate application of the various 
planning theories, i.e. the planning and implementation of the specific planning 
activities as well. This is a coherent system that can update the theses and paradigm 
of the planning theory in accordance with the Zeitgeist as perceived by the planner 
defining, at the same time, the main rules that govern planning. It can also give 
answers to the main dilemmas that arise about planning and the procedure to fol-
low. It discusses the relevant theories and schools of planning as tools or proce-
dures that can be chosen in various situations or in the pursuit of specific goals. It 
follows from the above considerations that instead of picking out or creating a 
(meta)-narrative for a specific application trying to prove its universal truth and 
general applicability it provides a general framework for a set of compatible narra-
tives with multiple components comprising a great variety of values and assump-
tions. Its theses formulated at a higher level of generalization (abstraction) tend to 
synthesize/integrate the various approaches without banning any of them or refus-
ing to enlarge its set of tools. It is precisely this feature of the theory that makes it 
possible for planners to find in it the answers or tools required in rather different 
situations or for different purposes. A good workshop is characterized by the avail-
ability of different kinds of expertise and a wide range of tools allowing the effi-
cient solution of the problems that may arise or the implementation of the given 
tasks.  
In my theory spatial planning is not treated as an independent theory of plan-
ning, but as an activity overlapping public planning considering that the definition 
of the content of spatial plans, the related decision-making, legitimation, etc. are 
linked to territorially separate communities. This is quite obvious in the case of 
spatial plans of development type, but in the case of physical planning the emphasis 
is not on the separation/demarcation of the activity, but on the integration of physical 
planning into the community planning process at various levels (see last chapter).  
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2 Changing paradigms in planning  
Besides advocating the need to retain the pluralist, sometimes contradictory views, 
I am also convinced that the planning practice formerly referred to as positivist, is 
undergoing a transformation and we can witness the emergence of a post-empiric, 
post-positivist paradigm, which is modernist in a ‘post-modernist’ way.  
The changes we can perceive at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries may make 
it self- evident for us to make the basic distinction between modern and post-mod-
ern views.  
In my opinion planning is the product of the modern age, and there is no such 
thing as post-modern planning (see section 5.5). The reason why I prefer to de-
scribe the recent trends as normative or concept-driven planning, instead of using 
the term post-positivist is that besides transcending classical positivism and em-
pirio-criticism, the emerging paradigms integrate some new types of (neo)-positiv-
ist ambitions (components) as well.  
Table 1 
POSITIVIST NORMATIVE 
 APPROACH 
absolutist relativist 
objective subjective 
objective-subjective true-false  
empiric rationalist 
causality teleology 
structuralism existentialism 
moral universalism cultural differentiation 
meta-narrative multitude of ‘small narratives’  
induction deduction  
analysis synthesis 
descriptive normative 
experience self-reflection, vision of the future 
‘because’ ‘in order that’ 
constant environment constituted ‘lifeworld’ 
measurable quantity quality, value 
persuasion, assertion criticism, argumentation 
technical, instrumental rationality practical, communicative 
rationality  
work, performance discourse, understanding 
justification validity, legitimation 
homo oeconomicus experience subjective 
Source: Author’s. 
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The list is far from complete; it is only meant to illustrate the point without any 
importance attributed to the order of the items. There is a partial overlap between 
the concepts listed in the two columns. It does not follow from the pragmatic ap-
proach used here that the concept pairs entered in the same line of the table are in 
antinomy: there is an axis between the two columns along which items can be cho-
sen freely. If someone prefers to build his conceptual framework from items of the 
first column, he can be expected to identify the tasks deemed necessary under the 
determining and restricting conditions of the socio-economic environment, closely 
linked to the empirical world. The planner, who puts his faith in the validity of the 
second column, will tend to emphasize synthesis, the formulation of a concept and 
– fully aware of the possibility of mistakes – attributes more importance to moni-
toring and the learning process. 
My view is that the main distinction should be made between concept-driven 
(normative) planning based on teleology and the empiric-analytic theory of 
planning based on positivism (Table 1). Since the new paradigm is still in the stage 
of formation, all we can observe in the practice of planning is only the 
strengthening of the items in the second column, and increasing preference for their 
application. Further concretising these trends to the planning activity I have 
identified the differences shown in Table 2.  
Table 2 
Some characteristics of empirical-analytic 
 and concept- driven planning 
 EMPIRICAL-ANALYTIC CONCEPT-DRIVEN 
Philosophical 
foundation 
positivism, materialism, deter-
minism, evolutionism 
Post-positivism, spatial-cultural 
relativism, criticism, communi-
cative ethics 
Ideology Totalitarian, instrumental The concomitance and concep-
tualisation of theories  
Knowledge Dualism of the descriptive and 
the normative 
Critical, practical  
Motivation, the 
basis of planning 
‘what there is’; familiarity with 
reality perceived as objective and 
the preliminary events 
’because…’ 
‘what there should be’, truth 
valid then and there, norms and 
intentions  
’in order that….’ 
Methods analysis, induction, scientific ra-
tionalism, scientism 
synthesis, deduction, argumen-
tation (dialectics), historically 
determined „communicative 
mind ”, understanding 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 EMPIRICAL-ANALYTIC CONCEPT-DRIVEN 
Tools Scientifically proven (accepted 
by the power) models, patterns, 
measures 
Search for consensus, proce-
dures valid in the given context, 
patterns of interpretation, cultur-
ally internalised assumptions  
Criteria of evalua-
tion 
‘objectivity’, measurable results, 
scientific quality  
Validity, legitimation, ‘aesthetic 
experience’ 
The function of the 
plan or planning 
administrative, a tool of power, it 
allocates, prescribes, prohibits, 
restricts, divides 
A tool for the realization of free 
will, it creates opportunities  
Goals/political 
context 
sectorial, ‘product oriented’ Territorial, problem-oriented  
Space The receptive physical structure, 
‘projector screen’- the area of 
practical work  
Interrelationships of contents  
Citizen The object of planning and ex-
ecutive 
Active participant in the 
development, implementation 
and monitoring of the plan  
Planner Rationally thinking expert, aim-
ing at ‘objectivity’  
moderator, catalyst, receptor, 
subjective , intuitive expert, 
working with semantic contents  
Preferred solu-
tions, technology 
The most efficient (standardized, 
uniform) 
Locally suitable (individual, 
flexible) 
Planning Drawing up of the document  Interactive and interpretative 
learning process, argumentative 
procedure, ‘discourse about the 
truth’ 
Decision-making In a hierarchic structure those 
who have power, the role of the 
central/national level is out-
standing  
Decentralized groups of social-
ized individuals, in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity 
Target organiza-
tion 
The public sector, large (eco-
nomic) organizations  
Small organizations, the civil 
society, individuals 
Source: Author’s. 
All things considered I advocate the normative approach to planning and con-
tend that the concept developed in the course of debates or discourses is crucial for 
the process of planning, without excluding the possibility that functional-allocative 
planning is also conceivable if several strict conditions are met simultaneously. The 
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process of planning as a whole is a normative activity even if the positivist ap-
proach can be applied only to a specific stage of it, i.e. the drawing up of the plan-
ning document. However, it is true even in this case that the choice of a tool in-
volves a choice of value as well, therefore planners’ loyalty and commitment en-
tails observation of specific norms.  
3 Description and maxims of the general concept 
of planning 
Like many other concepts, planning is not easily discussed in generality, independ-
ently of space and time, or the historical-political context, because neither its ob-
ject, nor is methodology (form) are constant, and the various (political) cultures 
also have quite different ideas of what planning is. Public planning is a constantly 
changing evolutionary process of social technique. To make the situation even 
more complicated, planning as a tool is used by the basic units of the economy and 
the society in the same way as by governments and their various supra-national 
communities. In spite of all these difficulties I attempt to define the essence of 
planning, which can be grabbed in most of the cases, as well as to formulate the 
currently prevailing maxims because they are the main factors in defining the sub-
ject matter of planning theory, and setting the boundaries of its theses and con-
cepts.  
The main question that empirical-analytical sciences seek to answer is ‘How 
can we know what there is?’ and how is it possible to reproduce what has existed 
so far even if in a different form of only in the bud. The majority of positivists or 
Marxists consider ‘future as a past’ that will take place after the present. In their 
view this future has already existed in some form in the past and is with us in the 
present as well. In contrast with this the theory of planning seeks to answer the 
question ‘how we can find out how to’ define the future ‘we wish to shape’ and 
what should we do, in what way and using what tools in order to realize the 
‘dreams about a bright future’ or how it is possible to bring about something that 
has never existed before. Methodologies based strictly on formal logics or determi-
nistic relations do not allow planners to constitute target-causes or to plan. Plan-
ning focuses on setting goals, developing concepts on the basis of transcendental 
logics, and in this way makes the solution of the problems of practical life an or-
derly activity.  
In this chapter I attempt to define the essence of planning, i.e. describe its basic 
assumptions, and those elements of its paradigm that can count on general validity. 
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These together constitute the basis for a possible theory (meta-planning). The the-
ory of formal and procedural issues will be discussed later.  
In the search for the essential elements of planning I make two restrictions: 
• My analysis is concerned exclusively with planning in the public sector, re-
lated to public policy therefore the features of business planning are not in-
cluded; 
• Planning, as it is understood in our days, is linked to modern age, and this is 
the object of my study. Modern consciousness integrated historical and uto-
pian thinking; modern man beliefs in progress, the possibility of setting and 
achieving positive goals, consequently in the possibility and sense of plan-
ning as well.  
In a philosophical sense the past and the present cannot serve as a basis for de-
termining what should be done, because there is no methodological link between 
the past and the future. The only way to bridge this gap is to accept certain pre-
liminary assumptions and build a methodology on them. The assumptions and the 
various principles can create a symbolic meta-system in which our decisions about 
the future can be made and which can serve as a framework for reorganizing the 
known and unknown (not explicit) factors.  
Assumptions (dogmas, axioms): 
• I assume the existence of the unknown, constantly changing reality, the need 
to get to know it and the endless changes in cognition.  
• Man is a being condemned to constantly concretising his views, (Wittgen-
stein) making choices and taking actions. 
• Teleological action is characteristic of man only and planning is its 
operationalization, its explicit form.  
• In order to interpret planning as a teleological activity we have to recognize 
the ability of actors to have opinions, make decisions and implement them. 
• Our choices and decisions are influenced by ‘external resistance’: the praxis 
of others and the availability of the resources (shortage). 
• I accept rationalization as a teleological principle, built on the possibility of 
transcendence. 
•  I accept the efficiency principle without restricting is application to eco-
nomic achievement alone. I allow the broadest possible interpretation of 
positive changes.  
• I accept that the public sector can interfere with the private sector if neces-
sary, after careful deliberation of each individual case. 
•  I accept the need for a pragmatic approach in daily practice; decisions can be 
inevitable even without certainty or the knowledge of the optimal solution 
(not deciding is also a kind of decision). 
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At the abstraction level (in the broad sense) of the general theory (meta-plan-
ning) purposeful foresight, action based on it, the assessment of results and the 
drawing of conclusions, as well as their different variations can all be considered as 
planning, because planning in practice is also heterogeneous, united by the similar-
ity of intentions and methods. Every planning activity defines tasks or series of 
actions in order to avoid problems that may arise in the future, to achieve better 
results, or simply to control certain situations. The main point is the contingent or 
the accidental and overall determinism (e.g. historicism, historical materialism, or 
geographic determinism) are opposed to consciously planned (wanted) actions. 
The thesis ‘they do not know it just do it’ is replaced by the principle ‘we know 
more and more about it and do it’. 
Planning is used here in the broad sense of the term, while making plans is only 
an element of the process. Since there is no objective basis for foresight, plans can 
be considered to be nothing more than falsified hypotheses. This is the reason why 
I think it is necessary to create the unity of plan making, implementation and feed-
back. A planning cycle is a process comparable to a scientific experiment, during 
which our knowledge is enlarged, awareness increases and the new planning cycles 
become better founded.  
Plans are meant to be implemented. Without the element of implementation a 
plan is just a ‘written work’, a political document, which is realized by the activi-
ties of others when the tools required for it become available (e.g. political coer-
cion or incentives). In the course of methodical planning rational knowledge be-
comes more practical, i.e. the knowledge embodied in the planning documents and 
statements changes into practical knowledge manifesting itself in the activities. 
Planning helps us to systematize and formalize the knowledge we already have, 
transforming implied knowledge into explicit one. Implementation of the plans 
contributes to the objectification of the knowledge obviously incorporated in them, 
making it appreciable even for the laymen.  
The genius of Christopher Columbus consisted in accepting the new findings of 
science, namely he believed that the earth had the shape of a globe and set out to 
find India over the Atlantic Ocean. The strength, power and also the main hazard 
of planning originates in the process during which thinking is turned into praxis, 
and will is concretised. The lack of extensive objectivity, and the unpredictability 
of all the future consequences are typical features of planning and all teleological 
actions. Not being able to fully grasp reality, a plan (an assessment of the situation, 
vision) will at best make an adaptation of it, just like the forthcoming reality will 
also ‘adapt’ the content of the plan.  
The making of plans and the activities it triggers change our physical and social 
environment in a way that cannot be annulled. This change is irreversible! What is 
more, we may have different interpretations of reality depending on our world 
outlook, and imagine our future or create new realities according to it. The situa-
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tion is made worse by the fact that nature (reality) – and often a certain part of the 
stakeholders-are not able to say no. Even if a cry for help is transmitted by go-
betweens, the will of people on power can easily suppress it. In the course of 
teleological action man can influence the processes and – with planning becoming 
more and more widespread – both man and his environment are becoming to a 
larger extent the product of his own purposes.  
Planning relies on anticipation and prediction which is closer to reality than the 
visions created researchers of the future or futurologists insomuch that in the stage 
of implementation active steps are taken to induce the occurrence of a specific 
condition and if the assessment of the circumstances and opportunities was made 
properly, the attempt will probably be successful. Futurology focuses on our ability 
to develop a vision of the future, and the probability of this vision coming true. 
Planning, on the other hand, is concerned with the present validity and future ac-
ceptance of the planned and actually occurring changes. It is not enough to take 
action in order to promote the realization of the plan; it must be made clear that – 
similarly to the findings of futurology – a plan is not a reflection of a future reality 
either and has the inherent probability of mistakes. The foundations of planning or 
insight are not found in the future but, to a great extent, in the present.  
A plan is the picture of a future action in our mind, and planning is the process 
itself that creates this picture. The creation of the picture and determination that 
appears in the human mind is a decisive moment of planning. In order to arrive at 
the best possible definition of the vision (What do we want to achieve? Where do 
we want to get?) and the strategy (What should we do to achieve this? How can we 
get there?) we need to make the cognitive processes of the present or ‘internal de-
terminations’ more explicit, conscious and formalized.  
Purposeful freedom and responsibility (moral commitment) are key elements of 
planning, which means that the actions we take to help the future come true are of 
our free will and we have to draw the conclusions from the changes induced 
(learning). Freedom means autonomy, creativity, abilities that can be used to 
achieve our ends and is limited only by external resistance – as Sartre put it – con-
sequently it also includes voluntary commitments, agreements and all kinds of 
external impacts that could only be rejected at the cost of serious consequences and 
do not prevent the achievement of our goals. The reason why we create a vision of 
the future is because ‘we exist in the world’ (Heidegger, 1989), we do so freely but 
influenced by the present and we are also capable of recreating our environment in 
accordance with it. Since man is also capable of self-criticism, planning allows us 
to learn from our genesis, interpret facts on the basis of our experiences and even 
approach the Zeitgeist with a critical mind. In a deterministic way we can choose 
either to adopt passive conformity or – recognizing the new opportunities – we 
may make effort to transcend the already known conditions. Regardless of our past, 
we may accept what has become of us and can strive to become whatever can. 
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This, however, does not mean to say that we have to do something simply because 
there is an opportunity for it. Neither the past nor the goals projected into the future 
can relieve planners of the responsibility they have to bear for their decisions. If we 
are free to choose what actions to take, we have to assume responsibility for them 
or for not taking them.  
In the course of making and implementing plans everybody should be aware 
that others have plans and ambitions as well. An individual’s freedom is limited by 
the recognized freedom of others. If we accept the plans that others make and try to 
implement, they become an objective condition for us. Others proceed in a similar 
way: they objectivize our situation and by accepting or rejecting it, set the limits of 
our freedom in planning. Either they accept our goals and ambitions and then they 
count on their implementation, or they will make efforts to change them.  
The possible range of planning (content, geographical area, stakeholders) de-
pends on the consensus about the values (identical interests) and the conflicts of 
interests. Since a plan is to be put to practice, planning and legitimating the plans is 
only possible within the boundaries set by the conflicts of values. A conflict in the 
fundamental interests of the parties concerned may lead to clashes, open conflicts 
or ‘simply’ failure of the implementation. There is no communication between the 
different value packages or paradigms, therefore it is not possible to attempt 
building a consensus or involve planners with different orientations in joint plan-
ning.  
The maxims or meta-criteria that I consider valid for planning in the public 
sector at present are the following:  
• Public planning is basically a social technique which has a theory of its own 
and the operational practice ( modern theory and teleological social action);  
• It is not enough to foresee the future or want it to happen – the future should 
be created! Planning includes the elaboration of the plans, their implementa-
tion as well as a feedback process, thus contributing to the recreation of life 
world; 
• Planning is a self-developing system based on the learning process, i.e. the 
planner is capable of correcting his own mistakes;  
• Most of the a posteriori experiences are gained via ‘experimentation’, by cre-
ating plausible hypotheses and implementing the plans including them; Ex-
perimental rationalism dynamizes a priori knowledge and the new a posteri-
ori knowledge will serve as a basis for further progress; 
• It is an inter-subjective process of rationalization: the normative dialogue 
conducted with reality and inter-subjective communication both increase 
awareness; 
• It is a transcendental pattern, the method of transcending experiences; 
• Conception building (transcending, creating a paradigm, particularizing val-
ues) is a key element in it; 
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• Control is limited, it is possible mainly when the actions have already been 
taken; 
• It creates a link among liberty, probability and responsibility; 
• Relying on the knowledge available today it is actively future-oriented (it is 
concerned with the future management or control of some system or proc-
ess);  
• It gives rationalization and teleological action a systemic, well managed char-
acter; 
• It is pragmatist, externalising actual knowledge and purposefully transform-
ing it into actions (practical policy); 
• It generates irreversible changes in its environment; 
• It is a power game with many actors and several levels, a tool or medium of 
exercising power 
• It follows an explicit, well-articulated, well-structured and formalized proce-
dure; 
• It is a special form of communication: the documents of the process and the 
plans are the objectified versions of linguistic communication; 
The general conditions (the meta-prescriptions valid today) of ‘reliable opera-
tion’ (i.e. the effectiveness of the maxims): 
• guarantee of ethical operation; 
• shift towards communicative action (Habermas), promotion of convergence: 
efforts should be made to solve the problems by way of discourses, and 
eliminate the negative impacts of strategic actions; 
• separation of areas with consensus about the values, efforts to create identity 
of interests concerning the object of planning; 
• transparency; 
• guaranteed access to information; 
• competence (availability of expectable knowledge and necessary tools); 
• control over the process; 
• every potential stakeholder should be guaranteed (by the regulation) the right 
to participate (in a clearly defined way) in the planning process, to give an 
opinion and monitor the implementation; 
• planners and decision-makers should make efforts (within reasonable time 
and cost limits) to discuss with all potential stakeholders, to achieve mutual 
understanding; 
• efforts should be made to create ‘ideal speech situations’ in all the real 
communicative communities; 
• a plan should be plausible and feasible.  
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In conclusion let me summarize briefly the main points: planning is a cyclical 
learning and rationalizing process meant to shape the future and built on ‘experi-
menting’, a well-structure instrumental mode of success-oriented social action and 
also a tool of governance (management). A planner is a communicative individual 
existentially dependent on the historical present, and endowed with various argu-
mentative and strategic competences. A plan is a picture of intended actions, fixed 
(projected) at a given moment, a medium of communication, the objectification of 
social action interwoven with norms. Its acceptance means commitment. Objectifi-
cation (documentation) is required not so much for the sake of implementation, bur 
rather for transparency, the possibility to make comments (falsification) to follow 
the principle of partnership and to guarantee accountability. In order that the plan 
should meet the above requirements its use is regulated by the social norms and the 
rules built upon them. The planning document is a communication tool, which 
contains information, transfers messages and sets standards. Plans can be regarded 
as hypotheses which cannot be fully founded or verified, and which need revision 
from time to time.  
Planning, implementation and monitoring require a linguistic framework. The 
process of cognisance is realized through discourses, which means, most of the 
time, the correct (common) interpretations of the concepts. The description of the 
current situation abstracts the particular, subjects it to the intentions and the exist-
ing code system. The plan can be regarded as the unity of signs, codes, metaphors, 
norms and human relations arranged in a logical order. Implementation requires a 
new interpretation especially if the planner and the implementer are not identical, 
or if the plan is made for the long term. Reinterpretation during implementation is 
motivated by tactical and strategic goals within the given framework. The type and 
character of the planning, implementation and monitoring systems depend on the 
adopted rules and also on the allowed ‘intellect input’ and ‘value input’ 
(Nietzsche). 
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4 The canon of teleological action/planning: ‘we know it 
and do it ever better’ 
4.1 The cyclical learning and rationalizing process 
Drawing on the works by Weber, Foucault, Habermas and others we can establish 
that human actions of various types and of diverse rationality take turn from time to 
time in becoming dominant, holding power and thereby changing the teleological 
orientation of a specific culture, society or community. As time passes and dis-
courses become more extended and open, the knowledge and experience accumu-
lated by people results in a rationalizing process of progressive tendency. Increas-
ing publicity and partnership in daily practice together create a trend of rationaliza-
tion. 
Kuhn (1984) described the historical character of scientific rationalism pointing 
out that the modes of scientific cognition are not invariable and absolute, but 
changing and dependent on time (and also place, I believe). Paraphrasing the em-
pirical thinking of logical positivists we can formulate the requirement that plan-
ning should always rely on the knowledge available at its time and meet the meth-
odological ideal of the age. We have reason to assume that the amount of knowl-
edge increases and its quality improves during the subsequent planning cycles 
(cumulative model of development), consequently the whole teleological action 
(making plans and implementing them) is a progressive (developing) process, even 
if this progress is not linear, and by integrating the results of the learning process in 
it later stages it becomes increasingly ‘superior’. The same knowledge and methods 
were not available in the earlier stages, it is therefore understandable (but not nec-
essary) that in the light of more recent knowledge former results or decisions do 
not appear to be good and what was earlier accepted as true, may later turn out to 
have been false.  
I use the method of hypothetic deduction in an attempt to reconcile the frame-
work of the above described positivist model with the views emphasizing the un-
certainty of cognition, and the Popper’s ideas on scientific research (Popper 1976, 
1997). Popper holds that the development of science should not be interpreted as 
the simple accumulation of true knowledge but as an ever stronger convergence 
towards the truth (evolutionary convergence model) The intentions formulated at 
the beginning of the planning process are to be considered as hypotheses that 
should be subject to professional reviews and normative criticisms (falsification) 
following ex ante evaluation and social debate. The corroboration of the vision, the 
goals and priorities by the experts (i.e. checking compliance with the scientific 
paradigms and methods) is acceptable only in relation to the community concerned, 
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in the given time and pace. This can be guaranteed by the jointly accepted norms, 
and the consensus achieved after the debate concerning the values. 
The consistent application of the formal planning operations is essentially a 
process of rationalization, capable of self-correction on the basis of the experiences 
and guiding principles. In this way community planning becomes the formal tool of 
social rationalization, which is institutionalised in the more highly developed so-
cieties in the form of ‘methodical conduct’ (Weber). Planners become more and 
more ‘conscious’, capable of analysing events with better efficiency, identifying 
the relevant parts of the ongoing communication or use of language, assessing the 
future consequences of their own acts and the after effects on their own life and 
they can foresee more and more steps of future developments.  
The process/result of planning is not suitable for the formulation of general 
laws, but the use of adequate tools in the adequate procedure may foreshadow pro-
gress. For technical reasons or easier manageability it seems helpful to treat the 
increasingly complex process of social planning as a sequential system, and break 
down the individual cycles as well. Sequentiality means that the system develops 
through series of learning and feedback processes changing the technology of 
planning and the content of the plans as well. Instead of forming circles, the cycles 
progress in the form of a spiral, with occasional interruptions. The subsequent 
learning cycles cause irreversible changes both in reality and in the cognitive 
sphere.  
The planning process built on the learning cycles means the realization of the 
principle ‘we know it and do it ever better’ which expresses the increasing con-
sciousness of planning. The rationalization spiral of the planning cycles is shown in 
Figure 1. The initial conditions at point tx are never identical with the knowledge 
available at tx-1 and the other conditions. The subsequent initial hypotheses have 
greater and greater empirical (truth) content. Progress is achieved through learn-
ing, or ‘understanding perception’ (Heidegger) making it possible for the new pro-
grammes to have additional content, or show improvement over the ones they re-
place.  
In the case of a radical change in the environment (e.g. economic depression or 
September, 11, 2001) the emergence of new norms (e.g. change of regime or gen-
eral elections when new values are voted for) or a crisis (e.g. bankruptcy or natural 
disaster) it is not possible to build directly on former experiences and continue the 
former trends; the rationalization spiral may be interrupted and it becomes 
necessary to start a new cycle by way of radical planning (to be discussed later). In 
such situations emphasis is not on continuity but on wanting something new. There 
may be partly or totally different, alternative courses as well that can either fade 
away in time or prove to be better and become dominant.  
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Figure 1 
Rationalization spiral of planning cycles 
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There is a great variety in the time horizon of the planning cycles and it is very 
difficult to define it in general terms. It is more and more frequently emphasized by 
environmentalists, futurologists and physical planners that plans should be made 
for longer periods of time and the future should be considered as important as the 
present. I do understand this demand or intention, but with regard to the difficulties 
of foresight, the problems involved in the assessment of the validity of visions and 
the justification arising from the results of the actions I feel more inclined to 
achieve the original goal with cyclical (preferably medium-term) planning that is 
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better adjusted to the object of planning. In this way it becomes possible to reduce 
the risk inherent in the choice of values, the identification of goals and the ensuing 
action, and we can be more certain about meeting requirements like sustainable 
society or social justice (fairness). Continuous or cyclical planning does a better 
service to our vision of the future than a one-time long-term plan.  
As far as values are concerned: their changes can be perceived in the present 
only and their survival can be assumed with more probability in the medium term 
than in the long run. The same is true for our judgement on these values. The short- 
and medium-term planning cycles created by the need for frequent feedback 
(praxis-rationality), long-term thinking and responsibility taken for the future are 
all present in the planning process urging us to give priority to values of general 
validity in the formulation of medium-term tasks, i.e. values which can be expected 
to survive in the long run.  
Planning is also continuous experimentation, an activity where theory and prac-
tice are collated with each other. Not being satisfied with the experiences already 
gained, we set out to acquire new knowledge by putting our hypotheses into prac-
tice. In the course of cyclical planning some of our a priori hypotheses turn into a 
posteriori knowledge.  
Figure 2 shows the dual cycles of learning and monitoring present in planning. 
Teleological thinking and (re)conceptualization are affected by the historical set-
ting, the territorially-culturally determined situation of action, some factors of 
which can be highlighted and presented in an explicit way. The action situation is 
actually a part of the environment (lifeworld) picked out by the actors of planning 
and constituted by the elements considered relevant to it in the light of the opportu-
nities linked to the object (subject matter) of planning. It is the object of planning 
that delimits the scope of relevance that the exploration of the situation and 
evaluation is focused on. The arrow indicating orientation expresses the unity of 
teleological thinking and action, aimed at deliberately inducing changes in its envi-
ronment. 
The figure shows that the external environment, especially the action situation 
in its complexity is not only part of the input – or we might say the ‘raw material’ 
in the Marxian sense – of the planning process, but its output as well. Teleological 
action transforms the physical and social environment, it has an impact on the 
norms and even ‘increases’ our experiences and knowledge. 
Figure 2 presents two learning/feedback cycles of praxis-rationality. In the in-
ner (lower) cycle we aim at empirical self-justification, while in the upper (inter) 
cycle we seek to achieve normative acceptance. The learning cycle taking place in 
the upper, inter-subjective area and the normative control (acceptance) together 
produce the current interpretation of truth. The judgement made in the outer cycle 
is rooted in the moral knowledge of all those concerned. Social rationalization can 
only be ensured by the external learning cycle.  
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Figure 2 
The learning and control circles of planning  
 
 
Source: Author’s. 
The external (or upper as shown in Figure 2) learning cycle controls not only 
the process of plan-making and implementation, but the inner learning cycle as 
well, i.e. the whole process. This upper cycle cannot come about and operate with-
out the continuous documentation of planning and the consistent compliance with 
the principle of transparency.  
The implementation of the plan means that the intentions get objectified and 
after feedback assessment is made of compliance with the goals and norms in the 
course of implementation on the one hand, and, on the other, decision-makers and 
planners evaluate the process in a world created partly according to their own in-
tentions and they also draw the necessary conclusions. The new action situation 
created by the active implementation of the deliberate actions and their objectifica-
tion becomes the starting point of a new cycle. This learning process may change 
not only the evaluation of the reshaped external world but the subjective actor in-
volved in the process as well, together with his abilities and values, which means 
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that he will become capable of communicating in a new way, using different tools, 
and develop both himself and the process of planning. During this process the 
planner undoubtedly uses a particular part of the environment as a kind of ‘raw 
material’ in order to create a new ‘product’, thereby transforming a part of (both 
the physical and spiritual) world. 
4.2 The knowledge creating process 
New knowledge can be acquired through purpose- and problem-oriented actions. 
Experimentation is meaningless if the opportunities offered by rationalization and 
reasoning are not made full use of. Planning is quite similar to scientific research, 
the process during which new knowledge is acquired. It builds not only on existing 
knowledge, but draws on the unknown as well. In the course of the above-de-
scribed planning process we can acquire ever increasing and more profound 
knowledge. Thanks to intuition and personal knowledge it is not only explicit 
knowledge, but implicit knowledge, another component of personal knowledge that 
also gets integrated into the decisions or plans during the process of systemization 
and conceptualisations and contributes to the creation of something new.  
Drawing on the works by Polányi, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) and Nonaka 
and Konno (1998) developed the model of the learning cycle during which new 
knowledge is created. It is this widely known SECI model that I modified and 
complemented with the steps of the planning process (Figure 3). 
Knew knowledge is created as a result of an inter-subjective, inter-active proc-
ess involving the various types of knowledge, called knowledge conversion. 
Nonaka and his various partners (1995, 1998, 2000) distinguish four ways of 
‘knowledge conversion’, which take place in different spaces of interaction:  
1) In the course of socialization (joint praxis) people continuously exchange 
their ’implicit knowledge’. In the small scale physical space we can understand one 
another in the course of face-to-face relations, exchange information, and influence 
one-another’s values, i.e. the direct and indirect experiences increase the knowl-
edge acquired by individuals. This knowledge remains implicit most of the time, 
because the process during which individuals learn from one-another within the 
community does not require any recorded (written or audio-visual) forms or – in 
some cases not even verbal communication. In order to learn from one another it 
may be enough for us to see, experience and understand various situations. Mutual 
understanding is enhanced by the common culture, territorial identity, openness, 
empathy and –last, but not least- common genesis. By building and strengthening 
communication networks and new communities, by strengthening the pre-requi-
sites of ideal communicative situations as described by Habermas we can improve 
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the chances and depth of co-operation and the efficiency of information transfer 
and mutual understanding.  
In the course of planning this implicit knowledge manifests itself in the evalua-
tions, norms and will of the stakeholders on the one hand, and in the synthesizing 
or intuitive skills of planners and decision-makers, on the other. The total of 
knowledge that is available in a specific area or settlement without being tangible 
or explicit is often referred to as innovative environment. 
2) During externalization a part of the implicit knowledge is turned into explicit 
in the process of articulation. It appears in the form of transferable analogies, pat-
terns, models, metaphors, statements, etc. that can be understood by others as well. 
The transfer of knowledge to others often requires a written or other transferable 
form. Externalization primarily uses tools like dialogues or reflections taking place 
in the interactive space. During the dialogues personal knowledge and abilities (in 
the case of norms and values: the commonly shared part) are transformed into 
common evaluations, statements, goals, concepts and strategies. In contrast with 
the previous, original or natural process and space this one requires a more con-
scious structure. The media, community forums, professional events, the internet, 
public meetings of various authorities, etc. can all become the scene of externalisa-
tion. Explicit knowledge can be transferred and acquired by everybody, because is 
it assessable to all at least in principle.  
Methodology is the critical point, i.e. the question already discussed in the pre-
vious section: ‘Which parts of the values reproduced by the various communities 
and of the implicit knowledge including norms as well can be made explicit and in 
what way?’ or ‘Which opinion should be accepted as valid?’. In my opinion this 
methodology (or technology) is also the methodology of planning, which helps us 
make the apprehensible forms of knowledge explicit. The key issue concerning this 
process is the way in which power is used.  
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 Figure 3 
The SECI-model of knowledge conversion adapted to 
planning
 
Source: Own design on the basis of Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995, p. 71 and Nonaka and 
Konno 1998, pp. 43 and 46. 
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3) Combination is used to associate, integrate, structure and categorize the vari-
ous components of knowledge and thereby create new knowledge. Nonaka et al. as 
well as those who apply the SECI model hold that this way of systemizing com-
bines the explicit components of knowledge. In my opinion this can be true only in 
the case of analytic-empirical (mostly positivist) planning, which does not work as 
I have already pointed out. Explicit knowledge is generally synthesized by certain 
people form their own complex knowledge, therefore this stage also includes the 
addition of extra implicit knowledge to the already existing knowledge. All this 
takes place in an internal space of monologue. The knowledge created in this way 
can be presented in an explicit form, it can be taught, transferred and implemented.  
When a concept, strategy or operative plan is drawn up, the relevant knowledge 
and values are synthesized in a new way. I refer to this synthesizing stage of plan-
ning as tendentious rationalization (contamination) (see later chapters). Who will 
have the opportunity to perform this operation and whose opinion/knowledge/plan 
will be accepted and put to practice greatly depends on the outcome of the proc-
esses taking place in the power space.  
4) Internalisation means that while the new knowledge (the documents, the in-
formation heard) is put to practice (praxis-rationality) individuals incorporate the 
experiences gained during implementation into their own implicit knowledge 
thereby individualizing them. This process takes place in the space affected by 
practice.  
The experiences gained in the course of implementation enlarge the individual 
(both implicit and explicit) knowledge of all those concerned through the learning 
cycles of planning. 
Consequently, the process of making plans, or at least several steps of the proc-
ess are similar to the dynamic transcending model of creating new knowledge. In 
the course of planning we can make use of the implicit elements of social knowl-
edge and make explicit the essential elements of teleological thinking and action. 
The action strategies, or plans represent a new, synthesized knowledge which – 
when implemented – can provide new knowledge to the planners, decision makers 
(internal learning circle) and those concerned (internal learning circle) alike. Every 
planning cycle creates new knowledge and the knowledge spiral created by this 
process is overlapped in several respects by the rationalization spiral of the plan-
ning cycles.  
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4.3 The evaluation of the plans, criteria of validity 
Assessing whether the statements formulated about the future are true and proving 
them is the critical point of success-oriented planning, as a methodology of ration-
alization, creating new knowledge. The statements made in the plan are true if they 
can be proved in practice, i.e. the truth of the statements basically depends on the 
success of the ensuing actions. A plan is ‘good’ if it conveys the same meaning for 
everybody and works, i.e. it can be put to practice and proves to bring results (total 
of impacts). The success of the actions depends on the instrumental value of the 
programmes envisaged and their evaluation in the resulting new situation. Instru-
mental control (the achievement of the goals) is performed in the inner circle (the 
lower one in Figure 2), while moral and ethical judgement takes place in the exter-
nal (upper) circle, i.e. the social context. The ultimate criterion is whether the per-
formance of the actions defined in the plan can be accepted in the future or not.  
In the case of cyclical, concept-driven/normative planning the main function of 
evaluation is to provide a better ground for new decisions and not to give subse-
quent justification or apology. The validity of our experiences gained (a posteriori) 
by experimentation during the implementation of the plans is temporary and lim-
ited, therefore the new proposals should again be treated as hypotheses and sub-
jected to new criticism. Objectivity should mean the objectivity of this method of 
continuous criticism, being quite different from objectivity achieved by experi-
mentation in the field of natural sciences.  
The impacts generated by implementation and their acceptance can either 
strengthen or refute all the assumptions that governed the planning process. It is, 
however, not enough to have an evaluation subsequently, after the operations; we 
also need a preliminary examination of the correctness of the intentions as well as 
an interim control of the process of implementation, i.e. the choice of values and 
tools. 
The method using the results of the operation for critical justification is a de-
ductive one: hypothesis, based on a posteriori and a priori knowledge → action → 
a posteriori experience → acceptance or revision in the new situation. The results 
of teleological action (the impacts of implementation, either measured or non- 
measurable but perceived during norm control) may not be able to prove the cor-
rectness of the initial hypothesis once and for all, they can, however, confirm them 
a posteriori to various extent and this is of great importance for future progress. In 
the course of the planning cycles we learn to set better justified goals and operative 
programmes.  
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a) Ex ante evaluation  
Before putting our will into practice we need to make sure that our intentions 
are correct, and their planned implementation will most probably lead to the reali-
zation of our objectives and the creation of more desirable conditions. The diffi-
culty is that the choice we have to make is not between objective knowledge and 
lack of knowledge, but among hypotheses (beliefs), attempting to pick the one that 
is the most strongly justified and plausible. We can implement only those objec-
tives or promote the realization of those values which are expected to produce re-
sults that all stakeholders are more inclined to accept than of any other alternative. 
An agreement should be reached today about the expected consequences and their 
chances for acceptance in the future. The expected consequences are a priori pro-
jected into the future. In principle plans (objectives, priorities, programmes) we 
formulate can only be valid (true) and therefore feasible if – in a given situation – 
all the others concerned would have identified the same ideas and the expected 
impacts of implementation are supposed to be accepted by all stakeholders. In the 
given operative situation and during the extended discourse about them, they have 
the same meaning for everybody and judging them from their own viewpoints eve-
rybody finds them acceptable. The evaluation/judgment made by the planner in the 
present coincides with the evaluations/judgments made by others in the present or 
future. It is hard to imagine that this strict requirement can be met in practice, 
therefore the following procedure is chosen: We outline the vision together with 
the system of objectives and preferences pertaining to it. At first it is treated as a 
hypothesis, a cluster of basic beliefs, discussed extensively with all the stake-
holders involved. If the arguments brought up make it necessary, modifications are 
made continuously. The version that cannot be shaken either by the scientists, the 
professionals or the stakeholders or which cannot be replaced by a better one will 
be accepted as the best possible version at the time. However, we cannot say that 
there exists no better version. That is the most that ex ante evaluation can under-
take. The mode of planning is also of great importance: the method we choose 
should be able to guarantee the required coincidence between our potential pro-
grammes and ‘facts’ or norms of the future.  
As a starting point we can accept the pragmatist, conventionalist assumption 
that a set of objectives or a proposed operative plan can be used as an initial state-
ment for planning without being proved to be true or fair. False statements or inva-
lid conclusions will be ruled out anyway later on during the ensuing communica-
tion process, the debates by professional bodies and social organizations, so that in 
the end we will be capable of formulating the objectives accepted then and there. 
Falsification can be applied in the ex ante evaluation during the planning process, 
but the final conclusions can be drawn only subsequently, during the ex post 
evaluation following practical implementation. 
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Polányi (1994) also pointed out that we may not have to reject the theoretical 
forecasts or scientific statements simply because initially observations seem to 
contradict them; the discrepancies can be just temporary anomalies. The methodol-
ogy proposed by Lakatos (1997) may be even better suited for the theory underly-
ing practical planning than falsification in the strict meaning of the term, because 
his ‘research project’ – or plan proposal in our case – is closer to real life. There is 
no reason to reject our strategy after discovering the first anomalies as long as the 
programme keeps its momentum, positive heuristics and relies on the competition 
among the programmes running side-by-side. Planning can be interpreted as a sci-
entific programme, or an experiment in which the plan is always corroborated to 
the expectable extent and – as a hypothesis – is widely accepted by the stake-
holders. In practice we should focus our efforts on the implementation of the 
statement which cannot be falsified with all certainty and our confidence in it is 
justified by more facts and experiences than in the others, or which have obtained 
the support of more people than the other proposals. The only hypothesis or pro-
gramme we should allow to start the implementation stage is the one which has 
good chances for acceptance or can be expected to get full justification in the 
course of ex post evaluation. During the interim evaluation our confidence in it 
may increase or decrease and this may, in turn, strengthen or modify the operative 
programme. Within the (never ending) planning process a programme/strategy 
should only be replaced by a better one, which promises more additional returns 
gained in an empirical way (praxis- rationale). A better programme can realize 
more principles or objectives that everybody can agree on.  
b) Ex post evaluation 
Establishing or empirically refuting the correctness and future validity of deci-
sions related to plans is only possible after their implementation and to a limited 
extent. It should also be accepted that this evaluation is valid only in the given 
context. On the one hand, the feedback on our a posteriori experiences depends on 
the technical knowledge available at the time, and, on the other hand, it is trans-
ferred to us by the society. After the implementation we may find that what we 
supposed to be true was actually false and the expected impact was nothing but 
illusion. Revision will be performed in the light of this new knowledge. Ex post 
evaluation following operation consists of two components as illustrated by the 
learning cycles in Figure 2:  
• Internal control: The decision-maker himself attempts to evaluate the proce-
dure he followed. He checks whether the results achieved in the course of 
implementation are in good agreement with his intentions. This inner circle 
controls the explicit, operational part of instrumental rationale or ‘scientific 
objectivity’. On the basis of the impacts induced the choice of tools can either 
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be justified or refuted in an empirical way. Here justification is identical with 
success, which – in the case of community planning – is not necessarily the 
same as economic rationality based on the traditional efficiency principle. 
Plausibility of the plan, good preparation of implementation is proved by the 
fact that our intentions have been realized and the expected/promised impacts 
have come about. In this case we have a positive feedback from the internal 
control (learning) circle: the operations were planned properly, our initial hy-
potheses were correct, implementation was carried out in compliance with 
them and the results are in good agreement with our intentions. Assumed 
truth has been transferred into reality as it is proved by its implementation 
according to instrumental rationale. We had faith in the success of the tools 
and measures chosen and we did not fail.  
• Social (norm) control: the effectiveness of an operation performed by a suc-
cess-oriented interest group does not automatically entail the acceptance of 
their actions or the justification of the plan hypothesis. The stakeholders (or 
their groups) and other interest groups within the society will also evaluate 
the induced changes, comparing them with their norms and the objectives of 
others and providing feedback to the decision-makers (and planners) at the 
right forums. This is represented by the upper circle in Figure 2 as a norma-
tive control, with some respects of equitableness as well, contributing to 
moral ‘development’. 
The interaction of the separate systems of value and interest spheres leads to the 
rationalization of the common fields of operation. The validity of ex post evaluation 
has no retrospective effect, its importance lies in its contribution to the better foun-
dation of the new decisions. After correlating the feedbacks coming from the two 
circles (argumentation) we can decide whether the guiding principles of planning 
should be strengthened or corrected. In this way the result of ex post evaluation 
serves as a basis for the next, higher level cycle. Acceptance in a specific space and 
time takes place in an inter-subjective sphere determined in a more complex way, 
both territorially and culturally. This post factum evaluation is concerned with the 
result, the new operative situation, establishing the validity of the impacts attrib-
uted to planning and observed in a given place at a given time. The longer the 
planning cycle and the more significant the changes generated, the weaker the ret-
rospective qualification of the decisions made on the basis of former information. 
This is the inherent contradiction of ex post evaluation.  
c) Interim evaluation  
In addition to the preliminary and subsequent evaluations, several smaller, in-
terim, ex post–type circles of control and feedback should also be operated within 
the planning process. These interim evaluations are not focused on the basic prin-
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ciples, or the determining objectives, but on their particularization and the choice 
of tools. Depending on their findings, smaller modifications can be made on the 
implementation process. The exchange of tools, entrepreneurs, etc. can be gov-
erned by the principle of asset efficiency, with the objectives set considered to be 
constant.  
Efforts should be made during all three types of evaluation to use material 
(quantitative) terms. In the right stage of planning (e.g. formulation of operative 
programmes or action plans) the objectives should be expressed wherever possible 
in a naturalistic, quantified way. In the course of ex ante evaluation estimates 
should be made of the impacts expected and the same indicators are to be used in 
the course of the continuous interim and ex post evaluation as well. Our hypotheses 
about the objectives can gain experimental justification and thereby confirm the 
correctness of our intention if the expected impacts are realized and welcomed by 
the stakeholders. 
A lot of future problems can be avoided by socializing planning and rationali-
zation, by making the objectives, priorities and operative strategies public, and 
having them discussed extensively. This approach can also decrease the probability 
of a conflict between the two control circles. Democratic decision-making, or 
rather, having the plan accepted by all the stakeholders will reduce personal re-
sponsibility (of planners and decision-makers) and make these corroborated objec-
tives and intentions quasi objective for implementation. This could be a problem 
later on if planning were not made cyclical and the learning cycle did not lead us to 
newer decisions or the former decisions could not fall victim of new falsification.  
4.4 Factors influencing formulation of the will  
Representatives of the analytic-empirical planning schools based on the positivist 
philosophy emphasize the importance of exploring the current situation as well as 
possible. They look for an unshakable rock-bed and draw their conclusions about 
the desirable future condition and the necessary operations from their technical-
rational reasoning, sometimes even making pretence of being objective but con-
cealing the value premises and evaluation processes. The outcome of their activity 
is the mere reproduction of things or processes supposed to be right. External con-
ditions cannot be considered as the direct causes of the work we have to do; their 
impact is realized through the human mind. The noumenon is neutral; it does not 
hold and is not structured according to causa finales. Values are not realistic and 
cannot be deduced from specific facts – it is more important to find out what kind 
of truth we aspire for, what kind of future we would like to live in, i.e. what kind of 
reference the actors (planners, stakeholders) have of the world. As far as planning 
is concerned the key elements are the vision created in the human mind in an inter-
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subjective way and in accordance with the Zeitgeist as well as the decision to take 
action.  
Looking for points of reference in the course of planning we should interpret 
adequate reality as a condition that will come about in the future, simultaneously 
with the specific actions or operations. The longer the period we attempt to pre-
contrive for, the more uncertain the outcome will be, because the number of un-
known elements increases. The starting point, the basic information we need can 
only be found in the present; we can assume that some of it will remain constant, 
another part can be forecast, and certain determining trends will continue. We must 
bear in mind, however, that whatever the starting point or point of reference we 
may choose, we always have the possibility to criticise their genesis or even the 
Zeitgeist, to prescind from them depending on our expectations, our desire for jus-
tice, our will and creativity influenced by various commitments and our intuition, 
or even to create new visions. Our free choice and determination is also influenced 
by our assessment of the opportunities open to us, the resistance of the ‘environ-
ment’ in which the praxis of others plays a key role.  
The fundamental truth: ’what there is does not entail what there should be’ 
should be complemented by another recognition, namely that a given condition or 
operative situation is preceded by a previous one and even if there is no determi-
nistic relationship between two, the system does not forget, it is incapable of start-
ing from zero. Every operative situation has a retrospective meaning and one that 
points forward. As we have to reject geographical or historical determinism, we 
should not accept pure indeterminism either, because constraints do exist and we 
cannot escape their impacts; genealogy is also active and the genetic codes of the 
past and present will have an impact on the future as well. There is no such thing as 
general determinism but there are mosaic chains that behave in a deterministic way 
and we should always be prepared for obstacles representing various degrees of 
difficulty for those who intend to overcome them. There are also conflict-free local 
conditions, trends, phenomena and values which can maintain their equilibrium in 
the long run, and which we can use by either strengthening or disavowing them. 
Our natural environment offers not only a repository of opportunities, but also a set 
of constraints, a kind of resistance; our built environment can be looked upon as 
former knowledge objectified allowing us to learn from the results of previous 
operations. Historical determinism does not help us to decide what we should to 
but history has relevance for the present. Past experiences are selected according 
to the needs of the present operative situation. The emphasis is on the decision we 
make. The analysis of the present situation (genealogical, genetic map, Zeitgeist), 
the description of the present situation and its historical roots can provide valuable 
information for the definition of normative regulations and the necessary or desir-
able actions. We should not forget, however, that new things can arise not only 
from past experiences.  
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For the sake of illustration (and not justification) I attempted to formalize the 
definition of a common vision and operative programmes in a specific place and at 
a given time as a quasi-function, hoping to make explicit a part of the relationship 
and demonstrate that one of the components is not simply one of the many on the 
list but plays a key role in the integrated interpretation of all the others. The com-
ponents thus separated and made explicit (reality, scientific findings, the norms of 
the stakeholders and anything else that has not been named individually) are not 
independent from one another either. The dialogue they have with one another and 
their interrelationship are of particular importance.  
P = fi(R, S, s, Nj(R,S,t,),E) 
where 
P – is the result of transcending (vision, plan, strategy, programme);  
R – is reality perceived (explored), ideas related to the facts (phenome-
nological basis, practical knowledge); 
S – represents the structural, pragmatist framework, the constraints im-
posed by power, opportunities for safeguarding interests (artificial machin-
ery, social world); 
s – is updated science, scientific and technical explanation (theory) and the 
tools available (the explicit part of our knowledge about the object of plan-
ning, accepted by the scientific community); 
Nj – normative evaluations made by community j, their foundation, and 
criticism of the previous components (specific norms, regional-cultural val-
ues and evaluations, autonomous pieces of justice, local, ‘subject’, ‘minor-
ity knowledge’); 
E – other impact factors that cannot be made explicit;  
fi – the ‘type’ of function, the tendentious rationalization of plan-
ner/decision-maker i, the character of evaluation ( the philosophical, nor-
mative commitment of the planners, their ‘faith’, implicit knowledge, in-
tuition, etc.). 
The total of the first three components (P, S and s) contains the factors that can 
be made explicit within an operative situation i.e. all the external phenomena, 
structures and events to which the stakeholders are in some way related to, reveal 
their values and pronounce them true or false according to their norms (Nj). On the 
basis of all the above components the subjective planner (fi) creates his own image, 
determines his relation to the subjectivity of others and contributes to the planning 
process with his personal knowledge. Planners (the experts who make the plans 
and the politicians who make decisions) are in a position to accept or reject the 
norms mediated by the stakeholders and the valid assumptions or findings of sci-
entists, but they are not supposed to ignore them. In order to avoid internal subjec-
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tivity and to make a judgment of the conviction (i.e. to maintain it or reject it) it is 
indispensable to make explicit their relationship to the operative situation and the 
external factors as well as to have inter-subjective communication.  
The main driving force of the system presented by this schematic formula is 
continuous dialogue and multilateral communication, during which it is possible to 
establish the relationships among the factors and the actors’ opinions can also be 
reconciled. In addition to their reflexive monologues the scientists, the stakeholders 
and the planners also engage in a continuous dialogue with their environment 
which results in the formulation of the picture they have of reality (R). Dialogue 
with the natural environment is a ‘one-sided and silent act’. There is a continuous 
interaction between the actors, the repositories of the intentions and the structures 
(communities) they constitute. The ‘formula’ is about taking stock of the results of 
inter-subjective scientific rationalism (s). The norms of the stakeholder communi-
ties develop in the course of inter-subjective processes and mutual understanding 
(consensus) is the result of communication. The choices made by planners are 
deeply influenced by communication aimed at mutual understanding, even though 
the internal monologues also have an important role.  
5 Basic cases in theories of planning 
The theories listed below do not divide the domain of planning completely and 
without overlaps. There is no clear demarcation line to separate them and they can-
not be added up to produce an integrated meta-planning. The various approaches 
may result different groupings and we can also see (apparently) new theories 
emerge day by day. A part of the literature concerned with planning theory at-
tempts to clearly distinguish the various approaches (e.g. Limdblom 1959, Faludi 
1973, Friedmann 1987) highlighting their particularities, while other authors de-
scribe and analyse practically the same fundamental cases from the viewpoint of a 
specific application. The conflicting theories all reserve themselves the right to be 
critical. Most of the new theories have been developed with a view of replacing the 
former ones and not of complementing them. I am not going to give a list of the 
well-known schools here; my ambition is to identify the paradigmatic differences 
inherent in the basic interpretation of planning and analyse the points that the vari-
ous approaches emphasize.  
In a given situation the choice among the theories means, at the same time, the 
choice of a paradigm, but utility considerations are also important. If we are to 
have a real influence on the processes in spite of the consequences involved we 
should not choose functional planning. If our priorities are controllability and prac-
ticability and we intend to exclude the possibility of a mistake, we should vote for 
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the incrementalist approach. If we have no clear ideas of what could or should be 
done and we prefer long-term solutions, rational-comprehensive planning is the 
best for us. Strategic planning is recommended if we want to achieve something 
absolutely new and rather quickly and we have an idea of what should be done. In 
practice, however, the artful application of their various combinations can also be 
observed. 
5.1 (Pseudo-) positivist functional planning  
Planning seeks to answer two basic questions: ‘What should be done?’ and ‘How 
should it be done?’ The second question follows from the first and the normative 
answer given to the first will have influence the range of the special rational an-
swers that can be given to the second. Several authors (Weber, Mannheim and Fa-
ludi, etc.) argue that planners should not be influenced by any ideology just follow 
the objective principles of the profession. In the 1940s and 1950s representatives of 
the ‘Chicago school’ believed that politicians should rely on objective, expert plan-
ning. Several outstanding planning agencies (e.g. Royal Town Planning Institute) 
still follow the (written) ethical principle of (political) neutrality. How can this be 
achieved if we accept that planning is a normative activity?  
The core of the functional concept of planning is rooted in the distinction made 
by Weber between formal and value rationality as well as in the idea of ‘functional’ 
rationality developed by Mannheim. Weber’s concept of formal rationality is close 
to what is called ‘instrumental rationality’ in our days. Weber holds that value ra-
tionality is concerned with human purposes in the context of social actions but in 
other works, where he writes about economic decision-making, he puts more em-
phasis on technical tools, and materializable factors, which are closer to the notion 
of instrumental rationality. Weber defined both types of rationality as a logical 
relationship between the means and the ends/results, distinguishing them from 
value rationality, which has its roots in ethics.  
Consequently, formulating and setting the goals do not belong to planning – ex-
cept for some incrementalist cases – but to politics. It is this approach that lead 
Friedmann (1966/67), followed by Faludi (1973) to introduce the notion of func-
tional planning. It is a mode of planning in which ‘the planner assumes the goals 
(choices of values) to be given in the situation and is rational with respect to the 
means only.’ In this case planner is receives the goals from the client, a decision-
maker, or – less frequently he postulates them. Even in this latter case, however, 
they assume the autonomy of defining the ends and the means, their inseparable-
ness, i.e. functional rationality. The mission of planning is to define the possible 
ways and means leading to the achievement of the goals presumed to be constant – 
therefore its leeway is rather limited. Planners are not allowed to make rational 
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choices concerning value orientations or interests, because these are considered to 
be granted.  
This approach often goes together with a naïve empiricism, which requires not 
only the exploration and description of the facts without regard to the values, but 
also assumes that these facts get systematized by themselves (according to their 
own laws). As a result of this approach and practice arbitrary choices of value are 
concealed, responsibility declined and various manipulations become possible. 
Taking this positive approach too seriously we may find that the answers are not 
given to the questions we asked.  
The weak point in the apology of functional planning is that values can be 
linked not only to the ends/goals, but – in many cases – the choice of means can 
also involve values. A functionalist planner with a positivist attitude would not 
have the chance to choose among competing planning theories, modes or styles, 
because these choices involve values and are therefore considered to be ‘political 
actions’. He would not even be allowed to choose the most suitable means among 
those available, because different means produce different results, consequently 
they affect the various interest groups in different ways.  
Functional plan making and purposive actions usually have a rational justifica-
tion, and can be judged in a more exact way than the other planning processes. The 
choice of means at a given time can be justified with rational arguments and even 
the incidental failure of the means chosen can be explained after the intervention, 
when the facts have come to be known.  
In my opinion the fundamental contentions of this theory (paradigm) are the 
following: 
• Positive and normative approaches can and should be distinguished, because 
this is the only way to ensure moral neutrality of planners and the ‘scientific’ 
character of the activity (artificial maintenance of the illusion of positivism);  
• The definition of the desirable goals and means should be strictly separated, 
which means the separate handling of value and formal(functional) rational-
ity; 
• The actors in the planning process (planners, political decision-makers, 
executives, etc) work according to clearly defined and separated responsibili-
ties and competences; 
• Planning has a neutral technical form built on technical, instrumental 
rationality; 
• The task of planners is defined on the basis of positive sciences and rational-
ity with respect to the means (professional rationality), i.e. the end defines 
and justifies the means that are applied; 
• Planning is anaccepted software, making the plan means running the software 
using the hardware, its institution.  
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5.2 Rational comprehensive planning 
In the 1960s rational comprehensive planning was the most frequently applied 
method, which greatly contributed to the general acceptance of planning and is still 
highly recommended in our days. Its advocates claim that by applying some prin-
ciple of rationality in a uniform way we can mobilize currently available knowl-
edge for the solution of the social problems and thereby get closer to the attainment 
of a great, general end. 
The adjective comprehensive refers to the complex handling of the system and a 
multi-disciplinary approach. It actually means a multilateral approach, because 
manageability sets a limitation to the depth of problem solving. This mode of plan-
ning makes use of the available knowledge, is inventive in the search for new solu-
tions, and handles the factors of uncertainty. It is also sensitive to the various value 
judgments or political approaches, but – as it is usually made by an institution in 
order to realize specific decisions it does not necessarily make efforts to establish a 
wide range of partnerships. Agencies view the action space from a given viewpoint 
and may, therefore, miss some parts of it consequently planners themselves mean a 
constraint for the range of factors explored in the course of the analysis. The future 
success of this approach, the effort to achieve a comprehensive overview of the 
situation greatly depends on the extent to which factors in the blind spot can be 
taken into account.  
The adjective rational refers in this case to the ‘objective and scientific’ nature 
of planning, which means that its propositions can be borne out by logical argu-
ments and experiences. Logically this implies that this mode of planning should 
reject every hypothesis that cannot be underpinned by arguments and/or facts. I 
believe that every vision of the future and goal related to the future is a non-verifi-
able hypothesis in the traditional sense of the term therefore a compromise is nec-
essary.  
Representatives of rational-comprehensive planning often tend to ignore the du-
ality of facts and decisions and have a penchant for presenting the ends/goals as if 
they were the findings of comprehensive analyses. A rational action, like rational 
planning necessarily has a purpose, and makes rational efforts to achieve it choos-
ing its means and taking action accordingly. They do not make a distinction be-
tween technical rationality concerned with the means and substantial rationality 
concerned with the ultimate ends. In this way they optimize the ‘ends and means’ 
or ‘form and content’ simultaneously. They assume that normative questions can 
be given rational answers based on the scientific cognition of the past and present. 
Highly qualified planners are in possession of the scientific knowledge and meth-
odological skills that enable them to set better ends and choose the best feasible 
alternatives. Scientifically founded expertise can override ‘other opinions’. For 
 40 
lack of adequate information, elected politicians focus on public interest – and thus 
the rules of representative democracy are made suitable for decision-making.  
In the practice of rational-comprehensive planning formal rationality often over-
rides substantial rationality and the ‘technical’ aspects presented in a scientific light 
conceal the moral issues related to values. The definition of the paradigm to be 
used then and there and the identification of the goals are also performed according 
to the purposive (but far from value-free) preferences of the planning bureaucracy. 
The application of scientific analogies, methods and models tends to oversimplify 
the image of reality and limits the range of alternatives. The attempt to bridge the 
gap between theory and practice usually fails. Bryson (1983) argues that all com-
prehensive planning can produce in practice is the fragile functional plan of several 
‘sectors’ all treated separately.  
Rational-comprehensive planning is an integrated process in which every rele-
vant factor is analysed in principle and the knowledge gained in this way is used as 
a basis for creating – mainly by using extrapolations, unfortunately – a vision of 
the future to be implemented in the long-run. Then the alternative ways and means 
are defined and final decision on the tasks is made on the basis of their expected 
impacts. Because of the long time horizon performance is usually not compared 
with the initial ideas.  
Comprehensive planning – if correctly interpreted – has the following charac-
teristics by Dror (1971): 
• It is concerned with systemic problems that cannot be operated in a self-
regulatory way; 
• It can be comprehensive only within the limits of manageability; 
• It should be cost- and time-efficient; 
• It takes into account the states of equilibrium and disequilibrium, as various 
stages of development; 
• It optimizes the desirable impacts on future reality; 
• It is continuous and iterative, using breakdown into parts only as a tool.  
Rational-comprehensive (long-term) planning can be nothing more than an 
ideal, an aspiration because it cannot be fully realized. The newer and newer ex-
periments, chaos theory, evolution models, verbal models, the holistic handling of 
the phenomena can only make it less strict or less scientific in character without 
fundamentally changing the essence of the theory.  
In my opinion the fundamental contentions of this theory (paradigm) are the 
following: 
• It is generally applicable in all cases where self-regulation does not work. 
(This was the prevailing mode of planning for decades.); 
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• It is based on the rationality/model of ends and means. After clarifying the 
values, it defines the ends structure then, in a separate process but according 
to the pre-assumptions it analysis the possible alternative decisions and 
chooses the means; 
• It optimises the intended impacts on the future reality weighing the both the 
ends and the means; 
• It attempts to describe and analyse reality as a whole in its complexity and 
continually updates positive realism for this purpose. Within the limits of 
manageability it strives to be exhaustive. It is multidisciplinary and covers 
every relevant factor within the constraints of budget and time; 
• It is future oriented in an extrapolative way: the comprehensive analyses re-
veal the development trends and allow the formulation of fragments of the 
future. It uses the methodology of (scientific) future research; 
• Its main feature is long-term thinking; 
• The planning process leads to the formulation of a plan. 
5.3 Pragmatist incrementalism  
Pragmatism and incrementalism have a lot in common. Both tend to avoid radical 
changes, follow liberal-democratic ideas, and – besides the traditional technical 
instrumental rationality they take into account power related issues as well. Every 
kind of planning is pragmatist to some extent, but in this special case it is particu-
larly justified to emphasize it in the name as well, because this theory of planning 
focuses decidedly on solving practical problems.  
Politics is constrained to produce results, therefore the daily routine of modern 
community planning follows patterns, models and precedents, striving to produce 
‘tangible benefits’ and consequently prefers the incrementalist methods to the 
above described and criticized rational comprehensive planning that many find 
more desirable. The justification of the incrementalist approach is not questioned 
by the fact that social and welfare goals have recently been given more attention, 
which raises mainly questions of methodology and quantification.  
The gist of the ‘spirit of capitalism’ as defined by Max Weber (1982) is that in 
the ‘modern plants’ continuous rationalization has become the professional means 
of generating legal profit and improving profitability and this attitude has become 
the accepted normative way of life. The administrative and legal systems are im-
bued with the modern rationality of the west and its predictability to such an extent 
that this attitude or approach is now required not only in the economy, education, 
sciences, etc. but in planning as well. Since making money is not a ‘professional 
end in itself’ for the modern capitalist, similarly, result-orientation and its ac-
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countability are expected to govern all social actions. In Weber’s spirit of capital-
ism persons and official bodies with the authority to pursue planning are rightfully 
expected to strive for effectiveness, be success-oriented in the sense defined by 
Habermas and produce benefits that show in the balance sheet.  
Descartes (1991) considered systematic doubt and linguistic clarity to be im-
portant features of modern thinking. By the second and third rules of his ‘method’ 
every problem should be broken down to as many parts as possible or as required 
in the interest of finding the best solution and thinking should begin with the sim-
plest objects that are most easily understood.  
In his most famous work, ‘The open society and its enemies’ (2001) Popper ad-
vocates the method of small steps in social leadership as the only way to scientifi-
cally manage social problems. He believes that ‘part-oriented planning’ is the only 
method that can aspire for success. This method is not focused on defining the 
‘ultimate good’ and fighting for it, but on solving the current problems of the soci-
ety. This method of small steps is easy to apply anywhere and any time, and is 
obviously capable of improving the situation in which people live. The ‘small 
scale’ social reforms (experiments) that follow the principle of progressivity can 
usually be implemented without difficulty. This method allows us to get to know 
and continuously modify our ‘experiment’; to learn without having to face the con-
sequences of serious mistakes. With this method politicians have a chance to cor-
rect their mistakes without having to apologize for the errors by referring to the 
unfathomable character of the future. Popper also warns that if we do not want our 
decisions to be a ‘leap in the dark’ we should have an empirical picture of the ex-
pected consequences.  
It is practically impossible to perform the preliminary evaluation of rational-
comprehensive plans that cover the processes and phenomena in their complexity. 
The hypotheses can be justified or falsified only after implementation of the plans.  
The risk of errors can be reduced by breaking down our forecasts into steps or 
measures that can be expressed in exactly measurable quantities. We can also 
choose to apply principles or criteria which allow us to measure improvement (e.g. 
Pareto optimum, equity of distribution, compensation principle and test, etc.).  
It is impossible to take into account the totality of socio-economic processes in 
a complex way, it is therefore more practicable to break down the processes into 
parts that are easier to grasp and handle. The rationalization of the individual 
parts can be conceived of as components of development as a whole. Attention 
should be focused on parts that are of key importance with respect to the given 
problem and promise the most success. If we are expected to produce results with 
them and the programmes planned are taken positively by the stakeholders in the 
light of their expected outcome the system as a whole is also supposed to change in 
a positive way. The change is essentially the total of the perceivable (and measur-
able) effects and our actions will be judged on the basis of their effectiveness and 
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(practical) usefulness. The test of deliberate actions – as well as plans – is imple-
mentation itself and if there is a mistake in our judgement of their impact on reality 
we still have the opportunity to correct it in the next step (rationalization, learning 
process). The goals should also be screened before being set – e.g. with Popper’s 
falsification method – using criteria in the selection of the acceptable or possible 
ones which can be experimentally measured or justified in the course of imple-
mentation.  
The debate on incrementalist planning dates back to the study published by 
Lindblom in 1959. The author’s starting point is that anyone who is responsible for 
the development of a policy may come across several other goals and values while 
pursuing his goal and cannot avoid weighing them with regard to a political choice 
he may have to make. This is particularly difficult in the case of community poli-
cies, because a large number of various factors should be handled at the same time. 
Lindblom describes two possible approaches: the traditional rational-comprehen-
sive planning (Root method) and the one based on ‘successive limited compari-
sons’ (Branch method) The latter, also called the disjointed-incrementalist ap-
proach, limits its scope to fostering changes in the present status quo that are 
practicable and produce measurable and accepted results.  
The basic proposition of the approach known in literature as ‘muddling through’ 
is that we should minimize the risks involved in the changes we induce and should 
only move away from our present knowledge and practice to an extent that can be 
justified on the basis of past experiences. The difficulty is that whenever the cur-
rent processes ensuing from former policies prove to be undesirable, the method 
does not allow the radical new changes that become necessary. Even the small 
steps have an orientation! They also follow some kind of principle – either explic-
itly or implicitly – and are aligned according to a theory. In a given context we 
have to decide whether we wish to proceed by small steps but with great certainty – 
innovative incremental planning is a good method for that – or by taking a leap in 
the dark induce fundamental changes (radical planning) which might turn out to be 
positive, but we run the risk of making a big mistake! Incrementalism also implies 
that a programme promising measurable benefits should be carried out only if it 
does not involve damage to the environment; the method actually prefers solutions 
which contribute to the improvement of the environment besides pursuing a par-
ticular interest. With the small steps, however, we have to face the danger that it 
may not be possible to prove either the long-term damaging effects, or those that 
slowly improve the environment. A typical example could be the programming 
system of the European Union, where the identification of the strategic objectives 
is followed by incremental planning, giving priority to the environmental issues 
and supporting an action only if it does not involve any deterioration of the envi-
ronment.  
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In order to avoid the extreme simplification of the small steps method, Behn 
(1994) proposes a new kind of leadership ‘by fumbling about in the dark’. ‘Grop-
ing about in the dark’ the leader tests several ways, methods or approaches he can 
apply to achieve his goal. He abandons those that prove to lead to failure, makes 
corrections, learns and adjusts himself. Behn emphasizes the process itself, the 
experimentation which can help to avoid incrementalist comparisons, but he also 
points out that even those who ‘grope about’ should evaluate the steps they take, 
which is not significantly different from Lindblom’s incrementalist comparisons. 
This just is one of methods advocating small steps.  
In my opinion the main problem with the use the pragmatist incrementalist 
planning theory lies in the difficulty of its further development which should in-
volve complementing the economic goals and indices with social ends. Planners 
could be assisted in this work by the recent findings of communicative ethics. With 
communicative rationality combined in it Sager (1993) developed dialogic incre-
mentalism.  
In my opinion the fundamental contentions of this theory (paradigm) are the 
following: 
 It is based on pragmatic (limited, strategic) rationality; 
 Planning, as an applied science and as a methodology is capable of bridg-
ing the gap between ‘there is and there should be’; 
 This planning theory has an applicability limited to cases when the individ-
ual steps are easily evaluated. Comprehensive values cannot be evaluated 
only the marginal incremental differences. Progress from the present situa-
tion should be made by safe (small) steps in order to avoid mistakes (small 
step – result – correction model); 
 The normative and positive approaches can be reconciled in the course of 
marginal evaluation and empirical analysis. Values cannot and should not 
be abandoned because they constitute the natural structure of thinking and 
the results of a normative action can be demonstrated in another form as 
well, which is of equal value and reduced to empirical facts. This theory 
tries to link values and political goals to empirical experiences and usually 
reduces them to efficiency criteria; 
 It is possible to make an advance without knowing exactly the ultimate 
ends. It is the tangible goals and the strategies needed for attaining them 
that we should compare, and reach an agreement about the strategy chosen; 
 Be operational! Practical politics has priority over social theory. 
Operationality is of a technical character and is not suitable for making an 
opinion on equity or justice;  
 Rightness of our actions should be judged on the basis of the consequences 
they probably entail (utilitarian ethics). The alternatives considered can dif-
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fer from one another only in some measurable benefit (increment, pro-
ceeds, etc.); 
 The planning process is a series of small steps. It breaks down the process 
of analysis and concept development into manageable ‘elementary parts’ 
that are easy to comprehend and reduces them to comparable alternatives; 
 It take into account only the most important and not all the conditions and 
potential consequences (indicators); 
 The transparent structure and tangible goals facilitate consensus building 
on the basis of democratic participation; 
 The time horizon can be adjusted to the fragmented parts.  
5.4 Strategic planning (management) in the public sector 
It is difficult to decide whether strategic planning in the public sector belongs to the 
fundamental cases of planning theories or is to be considered simply as a variety of 
style, method or approach. Today I am inclined to consider it an independent the-
ory of planning, because its advocates markedly distinguish it from the other theo-
ries and practices both in content and procedure. This is also the theory that most 
characteristically embodies procedural prescriptive theory for me. The discussion 
of strategic planning/management at the community level is particularly justified 
by the fact that the operation of the structural funds of the European Union builds 
on a mixture of strategic and incrementalist modes of planning. Strategic planning 
was transferred to the public sector and spatial planning from the business sector; 
the experiences gained there were adapted to the community level.  
The evolution of strategic thinking after World War II has gradually led from 
long-term planning through strategic planning to strategic management. With re-
spect to my concept of planning the most important step was the shift from strate-
gic planning to management, the latter regarding planning as an integral part of a 
complex process including implementation and feedback as well. Planning in the 
broad sense of the term fits into strategic management much better than the former 
views which identified planning with the elaboration of the plans (project writing) 
in a narrower sense. In the present case the development-management process is 
accompanied by the adequate stages of planning and the control cycles become 
fully integrated. Planning is not a separate module within the control system (flow-
chart, modular structure) playing a role only in a given stage its operation, but re-
mains active throughout the whole process. Several management and planning 
functions or tasks get intertwined to such an extent that it is not necessary to distin-
guish them in practice.  
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Until the 1970s rational-comprehensive planning and physical planning pre-
vailed in the planning activities of the local governments and other bodies. The 
strategic approach first appeared in community/spatial planning in the 1980s. Stra-
tegic planning was first introduced in some states (e.g. California, Ohio, Wiscon-
sin) and large cities (e.g. San Francisco, Philadelphia, New York, etc.) of the USA. 
The National Urban Policy Report published in 1982 speaks about strategic ap-
proach, internal strengths and weaknesses, external threats and opportunities. This 
is a good illustration of the fact that strategic planning was practised not only in the 
economy, but was also used to integrate the sectorial approaches at municipal or 
state level. In 1984 the US Department of Housing and Urban Development sup-
ported the publication of a strategic planning manual, which encourages the coor-
dination of the various areas of development (Sorkin, Ferris and Hudak 1984).  
Strategic planning practised at community level has a component which has 
preserved its special character to this very day: the SWOT analysis, developed 
from the Harvard model. By the 1990s it spread over to Europe, and the EU even 
prescribes this mode of planning. In Hungary it became widely used after the turn-
ing of the millennium mainly in consequence of the accession talks. In our days 
strategic planning as applied in the community sphere includes the following steps 
or modules: 
1) continuous data collections, observation (sometimes only looking for calls 
for project proposals); 
2) recognition of problems, key components (opportunities to apply for grants, 
submit project proposals); 
3) definition of comprehensive goals and the mission; 
4) SWOT analysis (in practice the table is usually not analysed); 
5) elaboration of the specific goals and the strategies required for attaining 
them; 
6) development of an action plan or operative programmes; 
7) monitoring and feedback (control).  
Strategic management is closer to my interpretation of comprehensive planning 
than strategic planning. Strategic management is a complex process which includes 
the definition of the missions or goals, the formulation of the potential strategic 
alternatives we might use to attain them, the elaboration of the strategy details, 
planning the steps of the implementation, the management of the implementation 
and the evaluation of the results achieved, taking into account the changes induced 
in the environment as a kind of feedback. Intuition and creative imagination play 
an important role in the thinking of strategic planners because of their desire to 
create something new and original. It follows from this that the kind of verification 
used in the previous planning theories is not possible here. The evaluation of the 
(probable, feasible and irrefutable) programmes proposed is not possible until after 
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practical implementation, in a plausible way, on the basis of the experiences 
gained; therefore it is particularly important to follow a more formal procedure and 
choose a shorter time horizon.  
Several authors emphasize the importance of long-term thinking in the case of 
strategic planning as well, but in my view here we have one of the main differences 
as compared with comprehensive (long-term) rational planning. Because of its 
action and success orientation the optimal time horizon for strategic planning is a 
foreseeable medium-term, i.e. 4–7 years in our accelerated world.  
This view is underpinned by the requirement that a strategist (management, 
elected body, etc.) should produce some result as early as in the medium term. It is 
not possible any longer to get short and medium-term programmes (and their inci-
dental failure) accepted by setting vague and remote goals. It is useful to draw the 
conclusions from the medium-term actions and – with due regard to the changing 
environment or failure – develop new strategies, i.e. to close the circles represent-
ing learning and controlling as well. In the case of failure the chief strategist (it 
could be a group of decision-makers, or an elected committee, or a body, too) 
should be dismissed even though it is not so easily done in community planning as 
in business firms. In the case of success, however, he should be strengthened in his 
position. My experiences in the field of practical planning have convinced me that 
action-oriented strategies should be updated after each cycle, and modifications 
made quite frequently. This is not in contradiction with the point that the main 
strategic goals we formulate are usually of a more general character and take a 
relatively long time to change consequently they have a long-term validity. In the 
optimal case they remain like that but – following Popper’s logics of scientific 
research – we constantly subject them to critical analysis and replace them when-
ever a better alternative is found. In reality the main difference between long-term 
and medium-term objectives is that the former have a more general character and a 
long-term validity. In consequence, the medium-term programmes are elaborated 
in such a way that they should be in line with the generally accepted system of 
norms. When we come to define the course of action for our more specific goals 
(operative strategy) using our compass (strategic planning) we always keep the 
long term goals in view as true north. 
Similarly, I cannot accept the need to confront it with short-term planning, since 
in a given stage of the planning process we should formulate the short-term opera-
tive plans as well together with the specific actions to be taken, it is therefore not 
the differences that I wish to emphasize but the connection between the two, i.e. 
when and how will the strategic programmes be turned into short-term operative 
plans and how can their implementation contribute to the attainment of the strategic 
goals or the realization of the vision. 
Strategic thinking in planning is equally important for the public administration, 
the local governments, the agencies of regional development and the non-profit as 
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well as the private sectors. In the case of profit-oriented business ventures strategic 
planning is relatively simple as opposed to the public sector, where one decision-
maker is responsible for each field of action but his decisions are made on behalf of 
others and with regard to their interests; therefore communication among the insti-
tutions and interest groups as well as collective thinking play an important role. 
Managing strategic planning in such a ‘divided’ power context is a very complex 
task in itself. On the other hand, the strategic approach is most suitable for the dis-
charge of the tasks in politicized community planning because it takes into account 
both the external and internal conditions and is more strongly operation-oriented 
than long-term allocative planning (e.g. physical planning).  
In good agreement with the spirit of my present work (meta-planning) I do not 
treat Mintzberg’s (1990) schools as autonomous theories, but as specific aspects 
which contribute to the understanding of the whole with the special approaches 
they use. As these schools have pointed out, strategy development can be simulta-
neously interpreted as a process of cognition regulated in great details, an analyti-
cal process, the creation of a vision and a conception, a learning process, a bar-
gaining process, etc. and not just one of these. In the case of specific applications 
and their various stages, however, priority may be given to that one or another 
‘method’.  
In my opinion the fundamental contentions of this theory (paradigm) are the 
following: 
• It builds on the strategic rationality of the actors, which – in the local context 
and the given situation – attempts to pay equal attention to the reactions and 
opinions of other actors as well as the social expectations too; 
• The key issue in defining strategic action in the public sector is the establish-
ment or maintenance of a multilateral equilibrium on the basis of mutually 
accepted assumption and norms; 
•  It can be applied extensively;  
• It is success and operation oriented;  
• Strategy development is a controlled and – in most cases – formalized plan-
ning process taking place within institutional frameworks. It focuses on the 
identification of the (optimal) way leading to the desired conditions and the 
elaboration of the operative strategy.  
• The process of strategy development should be simple and transparent. 
• It is characterized by intuitive originality, a focus on changes, a search for 
frequently unique solutions, the intention to implement ‘strategic leaps’. 
• Strategy is the result of a creative, innovative process and it should be clearly 
articulated and feasible.  
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• In community planning it is difficult to make decision-makers accountable; 
responsibility is typically shared or declined. As a resultant of various infor-
mal impacts (lobbying, compromises, etc) decision is made on the goals and 
priorities by the strategist who also chooses among the means. It is difficult 
to decide whose strategy it is.  
• In my opinion – and in contrast with others – the typical time horizon of the 
planning cycles is the medium term, i.e. 3–7 years. 
5.5 Communicative-collaborative planning 
In the late 20th century many authors reacted to the new challenges that planners 
had to face by strengthening democratisation and giving more importance to lin-
guistic communication and understanding. Planning theory has heavily drawn on 
hermeneutics and other philosophical works on communicative action, nonetheless 
its must be admitted that these new approaches cannot – as if by magic – solve all 
the dilemmas arising in the course of planning, and several of their contentions 
preclude any relevance to planning.  
Research projects in social sciences have revealed that whenever the individual 
operative plans are formulated in a given life world with consensus as a result of 
properly conducted communication their validity will be conform to the norms 
developed and accepted there. The application of the discourse principle to plan-
ning promised a chance to decide practical issues rationally and without prejudices. 
Apel argues that a real communicative community where he can take models of 
interpretation and where his own concepts and propositions can be compared with 
the concepts of fellow creatures while trying to understand himself is a necessary 
presumption for the cognitive-active individual. The action aimed at mutual under-
standing can take the form of argumentation, a discourse between the partners con-
ducted in the course of common planning and debate of the plan in the context of 
topic discussed here. 
We should do our best to create ‘ideal communicative situations’ in an ‘ideal 
communicative community’ but in practical planning we should be satisfied with 
the possibility of a ‘realistic communication’. Apel proposed that actors should ‘not 
be expected to do more than their best’ in order to create ideal conditions for the 
practical debates and conduct them properly. This can be enhanced by a prelimi-
nary rational agreement resulting in the codification of the general rules of plan-
ning – as general interests on which the agreement has been reached – in the form 
of norms (laws or orders). Drawing on Apel and Habermas (Habermas, 2001) the 
following principled criteria can be identified that planners should bear in mind in 
the course planning:  
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• All the stakeholders should be given a chance to participate in the planning 
process of their own free will. In practice this means that the adequate condi-
tions should be guaranteed, or the obstacles to the participation should be re-
moved. E.g.  
− all the stakeholders should be informed about who is making what kind of 
a plan and on what purpose, when and where it is possible to take part in 
planning and/or give an opinion on the documents, etc.; 
− a communicative space is needed for face-to-face meetings (the choice of 
time and place is important, together with the accessibility of the place and 
the suitable arrangement of the furniture) with telephone and internet con-
nection; 
− everybody should be given the relevant information required (briefing, 
training, continuous accessibility of information); 
• All participants should have unlimited capacity of action and speech, without 
any restricting assumptions (continuous activity independent of the specific 
planning events); 
• The roles in the dialogues should be interchangeable and the debate should be 
free from all constraint; 
• In the course of the argumentation every participant should be expected to re-
fer to the grounds on which their value choices are made and consensus 
should be built on arguments; 
• Everybody should have full understanding of the ‘content’ of the plan and ac-
cept what is stated in there as complying with his own viewpoints. 
These efforts can be successful only if the whole communicative community 
uses a similar stock of knowledge and meaning, follows similar basic norms which 
are respected by all members but sincere and intelligible participation should also 
be required.  
Habermas (1986) considers the mechanism for co-ordinating actions to be an 
essential element of teleologically structured social action, because it allows the 
development of regular and constant networks of interactions. He makes a sharp 
distinction between communicative (co-operative) and strategic actions which 
represent alternatives for the actors. The former builds on ‘consensus’ based on 
propensity for mutual understanding, while the latter builds mainly on ‘influence’ 
to create a foundation for co-ordinated efforts. The two mechanisms mutually ex-
clude each other. Inter-subjective consciousness leads to shared knowledge, con-
sensus and mutual commitment, while external influence remains one-sided and 
consensus is easily broken when the stakeholders realize that the other party owes 
its impact to external influence.  
Habermas therefore sets communicative action based on mutual understanding 
against imperative, success oriented (or strategic in his wording) action motivated 
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by the interests of the powerful where the tool of persuasion is not argumentation 
but influence. He calls it fragile consensus even if the strategist – instead of using 
pressure – offers benefits that the other party finds acceptable. Habermas (2001) 
thinks that in order to decide whether we have a case of rational consensus or a 
phoney one serving the interests of a powerful group with all its procedures and 
decisions we have to examine if all the stakeholders would have agreed to the deci-
sion made had it been preceded by a debate conducted in optimal circumstances. 
He proposes theoretical investigations of social criticism for this purpose.  
With these considerations in mind we could give a negative opinion on the op-
eration of the support systems (for regional/rural development) such as the Struc-
tural Funds of the European Union, because the applicants’ choice of objectives 
and preferences identified in the project proposals (plans) is motivated by the re-
quirements set in the call for proposals in the hope of obtaining the grant and these 
rarely coincide with the real practical goals of the regional or local communities 
which submit the proposals. Habermas is right in concluding that in such cases the 
allocation of resources and the operations are not based on real preferences. I could 
refer to Habermas again in saying that the promise of material benefits should also 
be considered a part of life world, or operative situation. Unfortunately the as-
sumed social theoretical criticism cannot be put into practice and applied to estab-
lishing whether consensus was achieved on the basis of ‘a compromise of particu-
lar interests’ or on the basis of more ‘general interests’. We could perform a simple 
verification by allocating money to some local communities without requiring them 
to submit project proposals and find out whether they would finance the same pro-
grammes as the ones proposed in their projects. The answer would most probably 
be negative, which could be an argument for the recommendation that resources 
and decision-making should be decentralized.  
Communicative ethics as described by Habermas can be applied in practice 
only within certain space and time limits. It is not possible to get to know and jus-
tify ‘general interest’ or norms during a discourse conducted at a given place and in 
a given time. Habermas also requires that all potential stakeholders should agree 
but the range of stakeholders can only be defined on the basis of knowl-
edge/information valid then and there and even the potential stakeholders may be 
uncertain whether they are concerned or not. Furthermore, even if all the stake-
holders take part in the discourse, we cannot be sure that everybody is capable of 
clearly expressing their opinions, define their own interests or understand the ar-
guments given by others. Habermas supposes that during the discourses aimed at 
developing mutual understanding all participants tend to give a general validity to 
the standpoint they put forward. However, in the course of planning – which is by 
nature a success oriented strategic operation – only a limited validity can be guar-
anteed. I have serious doubts about the effectiveness of transcultural communica-
tion as well. An adequately performed planning process can do a lot to maintain 
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communication but it will not solve the problems. It cannot be taken for granted 
that the actors intend to reach an agreement. It is not quite clear what could moti-
vate them to do so. Moral acceptance does not exclude lack of willpower. It is fre-
quently experienced that even if we are committed to consensus building progress 
is often achieved through confrontation, conflicts of interests which seem to be the 
driving force behind the changes while consensus built on agreement may even 
conserve the status quo whose evaluation in the future is rather uncertain. The es-
tablishment of a consensus in itself is no guarantee for its survival. 
Open discourses should not be dependent on the will of any of the partners. We 
engage in planning in order to avoid problems, control processes or attain our 
goals, it is therefore unconceivable for us at present to sit back and wait for dis-
courses to begin, let the words take their effect on us, and the whole thing just hap-
pen internally. By asking the question whose interest it serves to create the ideal 
communicative situation we arrive at a strange contradiction. If a person ‘creates’ it 
in his own interest it becomes a tool of success-oriented strategic action. If it is 
nobody’s interest to create and maintain it considering its time-consuming and 
costly nature then why would it come about? It is our common interest to have 
matters that concern all of us discussed openly it is therefore reasonable to expect 
the gradual elimination of the obstacles to ideal communication, which will 
strengthen the process of social rationalization with planning playing an important 
role in it. One precondition of this change is to make planning the daily manifesta-
tion of the teleological action in which people live day by day. 
It is a critical issue to decide whom we should consider to be our partners in 
communication. At the level of philosophy defining the ‘parameters’ does not 
cause any difficulty, in political life, however, we are not able to create an optimal 
communicative community only a realistic on in line with the specific historical 
situation. On the other hand, those who have authority to make initiatives or plans 
also have the opportunity to manipulate unless the process can be administratively 
regulated as required by the ideal state. Even in this latter case we have to face 
difficulties caused by the periodicity of compliance with the regulations, continuity 
of communication, as well as the problems related to the application and obedience 
of the law.  
Even if all the members of a given community have realized and become aware 
of ‘what is good for them’ building on the traditions of their own lifeworld and in 
the course of ethical-political debates, the goal they identify may be in conflict with 
the norms and goals that other communities have formulated in a similar proce-
dure. If the discourse is resumed with wider participation and everybody mutually 
understands and accepts the common interest there is still a chance that the newly 
identified norms will again conflict those of others, not speaking of the future gen-
erations as potential stakeholders who are unable to participate in the debate.  
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The ‘communicative solution’ as described by Habermas – even if it can be 
reached in optimal conditions – can only be applied to allocative and innovative 
planning – the latter meant to enhance slow, long-term development. The group of 
those who want something radically new is left alone with its ethical and moral 
questions and since their main ambition is to change the accepted norms and 
structures the only model they can choose is strategic planning. New knowledge 
(e.g. invention, plan or strategy) usually originates in critical approach, ‘unusual 
way of seeing things’, difference in opinions. What consensus is needed for is not 
an invention or the birth of new knowledge, but their acceptance and legitimation.  
Habermas’s communicative ethics formulates the rational expectation that an 
actor (in our case a planner or decision-maker) should be able to refer to the guide-
line of his actions or system of values which served as a basis for his decisions. In 
contrast with this what we experience in the public sector is that planners usually 
conceal their normative choices with pragmatic arguments (e.g. lack of resources) 
and considerations (e.g. hope for success at the elections). In this way the norma-
tive values underlying the decisions remain hidden – even for the planners them-
selves – and the hypotheses escape social control. In consequence, rational argu-
mentation is often replaced by reasons of dubious validity. 
Ideal communicative situations cannot be created in practice. The development 
of operative programmes and plans is a linguistic process. The common language 
is a pre-requisite of conversations and understanding. Intentions and plans become 
intelligible for the stakeholders only if they are expressed in their own language. 
What we experience at plan debates and community forums is usually the con-
frontation of technical, apparently scientist and globalised arguments with the 
moral values and material interests rooted in the regionally and culturally deter-
mined life spaces. The other party is often unable to understand or qualify the ar-
guments requiring scientific knowledge and mastery of the technical jargon there-
fore this kind of communication cannot lead either to understanding or acceptance. 
The explanation (‘translation’) or elucidation is an additional medium which actu-
ally prevent the understanding of the original intention.  
Consequently, in the course of planning we should be satisfied with the imple-
mentation of the ‘strategic model of action’ presented so negatively by Habermas. 
Chances for building a consensus concerning the values and based on the common 
knowledge and language are rather limited. Even if the success-oriented actors with 
similar interests manage to make their decision within their own community with a 
consensus built on real understanding, in the course of implementation they may be 
compelled to stand up against external actions that might jeopardize the imple-
mentation of their operative plan. A typical example would be the fight for scarce 
development funds. Approaching this issue from a territorial viewpoint we can 
conclude that it is possible to develop a plan with consensus based on common 
history and knowledge within a community but towards the external world teleo-
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logical action turns into a strategic operative model in the sense used by Habermas. 
Without this we would engage in a never-ending process of reconciliation without 
ever having the chance of implementing our intentions. It is not possible, for ex-
ample, to break up a producing capacity built on economies of scale and transfer its 
pieces to areas suffering from unemployment, or similarly, waste should be 
dumped or disposed of even if none of the communities volunteers to do it unless 
some interest is linked to it and this situation is maintained by coercion.  
Even if the optimal communicative situation can be created and all the stake-
holders simultaneously understand and accept the intentions based on explicit val-
ues, it will have real validity only at a given point in time, and cannot be related to 
the time horizon of transcending, the whole teleological action, that is there is no 
guarantee for the acceptance of the result of implementation. 
The alignment of the various interest groups and planning communities with 
one another can be expected to lead to a sustainable order that is in equilibrium if 
we implicitly assume that although the outcome of such an alignment is not pre-
dictable, we are able to guarantee equity and fairness without knowing their exact 
definition or the way to attain them. 
The philosophy of Habermas was first adapted to planning by Forester (1989) 
and Healey (1992, 1997) who developed collaborative planning. In our days sev-
eral other experts (e.g. Hiller and Throgmorton) also emphasize the importance of 
discourse in the planning process. NGOs strongly support this tendency because 
they expect it to guarantee democratic participation.  
In my opinion the fundamental contentions of this theory (paradigm) are the 
following: 
• It strives for communicative rationality, mutual (reflective) understanding 
through communicative action; 
• It presupposes the existence of a pluralist, but consensus-based political 
(power) structure; 
• It complements representative democracy with direct participation; 
• It builds on meanings and truths that are valid then and there; 
• It tends to be an interactive and interpretative process free form power pres-
sure (institutional interests); 
• All participants are equal, capable or arguing and raising questions; 
• Participants should be trained and informed if necessary, they should be pro-
vided with all relevant political and technical information; 
• It applies the earlier developed formal means complementing them with 
moral and ethical experiences; 
• Assumes joint decision-making and operation on the part of the stakeholders; 
• It explores the background of the decision and presents the arguments; 
• The plans are less prescriptive, focus on future progress.  
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5.6 Post-modern modernity in planning: pragmatic eclectics 
Those who accept the possibility of post-modern planning might think of using the 
terms post-post-modern to denote the new era. My objection to the term post-post-
modern is that in my opinion – which is in contrast with other authors – there is no 
such thing as post-modern planning and there has never been – this is the reason 
why it is not included in my list. At the same time I am ready to admit that post-
modern critical Zeitgeist has had a significant impact on planning theories as well, 
namely epistemological, ontological and procedural dilemmas have been replaced 
by ethical, axiological, aesthetic and legitimacy issues, new techniques and styles 
have emerged and the external conditions of planning have also changed. Several 
representatives of post-modern social philosophy (Boudrillard, Derrida, Lyotard, 
etc.) claim that modernism has failed beyond recovery and it is all over now. 
Habermas, on the other hand, holds that the central ideas of modernity should not 
be abandoned; on the contrary, we should complete the ‘unfinished project of mod-
ernism’. In my view planning has been complemented with new, one might say 
post-modern elements and methods, which have given it a new orientation but 
planning as a whole has remained ‘a modern undertaking’.  
Post-modern criticisms have questions the transcendence of intellect, teleology, 
which has been associated with it ever since the enlightment, the rational founda-
tions of intentions, that is the possibility of (traditional) planning. The post-modern 
theories of social philosophy recommended in the place of modern philosophies 
‘cannot be translated’ for the purposes of planning or transferred into the practice 
of planning. Although post-modern planning does not exist, we cannot say that 
there is no need for planning or at least a teleological action that can replace it. 
Certain elements of ‘modern planning’ seem to survive post-modern attacks and – 
after a change of paradigm – can assume a function similar to the previous ones. 
However, we cannot step in the same river twice and post-post-modern planning 
cannot mean a return to the same modernity. Pragmatic eclecticism is a good re-
flection of fashion governed by Zeitgeist and could also be a suitable qualifier for 
the new theory of planning.  
The emerging trends and the new conditions – often referred to as post-modern 
– will bring about fundamental changes that affect planning as well. Lyotard 
(1993) believes that the traditional regulating functions of the state will change in 
the post-modern conditions. The traditional poles of power will also lose their 
leading role but their place will not be taken by others: a new, continuously 
changing structure will develop instead. Power is in the hands of decision-makers 
today that this will remain the case in the future too, but they will be recruited not 
only from among politicians and bureaucrats, but from a wider, more varied group 
including experts, business people, leading administrators, religious leaders, etc. In 
the meshes of relations that are more complex and changeable than ever before 
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everybody has to rely on themselves, their allies and co-operating partners. Com-
munity planning cannot be squeezed into a hierarchic, static order; future is created 
along the nervous paths of the autonomous groups of various types and functions, 
along the networks of their teleological actions, and plan documents are elaborated 
in centres of different importance.  
In the new power space the fight will be carried on for access to information, 
new knowledge, the opportunity to express and enforce one’s standpoint, and the 
right to engage in planning, instead of land or raw materials. Competences related 
to plans, applications, decision-making will be the objects of power struggles. 
Creative planning expertise is a marketable product. The worst blow that post-
modernism struck on traditional modern thinking was abandoning the conventional 
performance principle and questioning the power of consensus. Legitimation is 
derived from communicative interaction, language practice. The main point is how 
you can sell your ideas (yourself), get others to accept your interests and the ways 
you intend to enforce them, what is the value of your arguments or evidence while 
the effectiveness of your actions depends on what kind of co-operating partners 
you can find (Lyotard, 1993).  
A planner who uses post-modern arguments as well does not believe in abso-
lute, resolvable truth, he knows only norms that are accepted in a specific place at a 
given time. In the course of the discourses planners should explore the prevailing 
values and – through mutual understanding – seek solutions which produce no 
losers but promise the best possible output in the given operative situation, and 
help to secure the highest number of winning positions. Instead of the hardly defin-
able public interest efforts should be focused on developing an integrated policy of 
the citizens and their communities with the widest possible co-operation in the 
course of implementation. It is not the suppression of the energies inherent in the 
differences but rather their articulation and involvement that can guarantee social 
equitableness.  
We should be prepared to accept the existence of various approaches, yet, at the 
community level, we must find a way of handling heterogeneity and co-existence. 
The reason why we have difficulty managing this increasingly accepted plurality is 
that even our belief in the existence of the general canon and overall rationality has 
been shaken. The recognition of the need to find a principle or method which can 
help us handle the differences leads us back to certain elements of modern think-
ing, but not to the classical modern age. 
The classical modern planning theories replaced each others in succession 
therefore we have to learn to accept the co-existence of a variety of approaches. 
How can these be handled as a unit or system? The only way is to continue the 
course of modernization, the process of emancipation-evolution which started with 
the enlightenment, to emancipate the cultures the various faiths, paradigms, sets of 
knowledge and presume their manageability at the community level (with the same 
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partiality to each one of them). There is no single salutary order or truth that we 
could believe in; neither should we act as chance directs us and suffer the conse-
quences. It would be equally unacceptable to let technical rationality mediated by 
the market or profit-oriented thinking govern every area of our lives. By rejecting 
the need and possibility of the kind of planning that is built on uniform thinking 
and works by identical rules I do not mean to say that we should not make efforts 
to shape our life and environment according to our beliefs and principles. In every-
day life making decisions and choices cannot be avoided – neither can the delib-
erations and the search for some base of comparison. The main decision is whether 
we choose to act consciously, in a methodical way, weighing alternatives with re-
spect to our expectations from the future, in co-operation with others, i.e. in a 
planned way or individually, reacting instinctively to the challenges as they arise. 
The procedural rationality of pragmatic planners works through the process of 
theoretical and practical debates, a series of various components of rationality (in-
strumental, practical aesthetic, etc.) to find the best arguments and symbolics in 
order to build consensus about the ultimate goals or – if this cannot be achieved – 
in order to attain the specific, practical goals and maintain the possibility of con-
vergence. Planners are often compelled to be satisfied by merely outlining pro-
gramme alternatives that can assert partial interests without conflicts, and win the 
special contribution, involvement of the specific community to the recreation of 
their life world. The new type of community planning is expected to simultane-
ously bind and loosen, manage interruptions and continuity, co-existence and in-
evitable interaction while maintaining coherence and pointing to some kind of in-
tegration. A common ‘umbrella’ or ‘roof’ is required to justify joint planning. In-
evitable co-existence and common socialization can provide an opportunity for the 
co-ordination or interaction of the various life-styles and orientations.  
Classical modern community planning has fostered the consummation of in-
dustrial development, bourgeois power (liberal democracy) and is still doing so 
apart from the ‘socialist experiment’. It was built on the conviction that technical 
development and economic growth can contribute to the elimination of social 
problems and increase the number of people belonging to the emerging middle 
class. The idea that post-modern modern community planning has taken over from 
modernity is that its mission is to serve public interest redefined as being con-
structed from autonomous elements that are not in conflict but in a synergic rela-
tion; it is not technical rationality any longer, but uniquely the privileged means of 
enhancing economic growth. As it has already been mentioned, first criticisms of 
modern rationality of planning appeared as early as the 1940s (Horkheimer, 
Adorno and later Habermas) to be followed by more radical objections raised by 
postmodern authors (Lyothard, Derrida and Jameson). Modernist apology treats 
reason as the principal means the individual has for self-expression, in practice, 
however it can become the servant of power. The normative expectations from 
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reason cannot be realized in practice! Modern rationality does not always mean 
reasonableness any more just like scientific rationality does not necessarily serve 
the public interest. This in itself is no reason for the rejection of rationality in gen-
eral – but an indication that we should assume and accept its plurality. What we 
should do is liberate reason, allow various rationalities to manifest themselves and 
restore reason’s ability to operate in an innumerable multitude of transitions. Prac-
tical (common) sense is capable of combining the various rationalities, manoeu-
vring through the transitions and making use of interfaces. In specific cases it may 
be possible or even necessary to choose among the various rationalities and para-
digms but this does not exclude the heterogeneity of the world around us. What is 
more, there are no meta-criteria for the compulsory decisions or choices. Adapting 
the classical modern thinking we assume the existence of methods or methodolo-
gies that can help orientation, the recognition and initiation of relations among 
rationalities. 
We do not live in separate worlds, but our lifeworlds overlap and interact with 
one another. The diverse paradigms or approaches based on various rationalities 
each throw a different light on the same events of our co-existence. We are also 
free to find a more favourable light, set a new stage, rearrange events and even 
appear with other companies in plays directed by others. We can make our choice 
among the co-existing paradigms, correct or combine them, develop new sets of 
conceptual elements. We can co-operate with all those whose conceptual elements 
do not exclude ours and therefore convergence is possible. The strategic actions 
taken by others, mainly those we have agreed to, are not necessarily in conflict 
with ours, or are not sure to have a negative impact on our lifeworld; they may 
even open up new opportunities for us. A new paradigm can even help the paths 
assumed to be parallel today meet in the future.  
If we do not know the reality hidden behind the appearance, when we have to 
build on unstable grounds or running water and the traditional forms of rationality 
do not yield results we have to rely on aesthetic arguments. Aesthetic considera-
tions have already helped several scientists (Bohr, Einstein, Heisenberg, Watson, 
etc) in making their discoveries. It is often experienced in practically all disciplines 
that unshakable ultimate foundations do not exist; all we can find is some basic 
aesthetic rules in the dimension of foundations (Welsch, 1997).  
Communication, social discourse is also a kind of tool that is used in political 
games in many different ways. Discourses are not expected to end in a consensus 
all the time; they are useful even if they merely lead to the articulation of the dif-
ferences in views by making them explicit because this is a pre-requisite of man-
aging them. Some discourses are conducted under a stronger social control, while 
others are not, depending on their validity and legitimation. It cannot be contested 
that there is justification even for a strategic behaviour deriving from commitment 
to some partial system. In practice we must find a way to manage the conflicts 
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among the various strategic operations and also among their communicative strate-
gies, making efforts to converge them.  
In our days several authors (e.g. Gerhard Schulze, Georg Simmel, or Wolfgang 
Welsch) consider the aestheticization of lifeworld – i.e. that an increasing number 
of people are not governed in their daily life by their goals but by aesthetic consid-
erations – as a sign of a new era beginning. This aesthetic ‘boom’ is observed today 
not only in the individual styles but in the economy, urban planning, image devel-
opment of regions and countries as well. Reality tends to be an aesthetic construct 
and the world is being turned into a domain of experience.  
Aestheticizing has become a part of strategic planning in the economy as well. 
Strategies and programmes now focus on creating fashion, covering products with 
an aesthetic polish and maintaining a high level of consumption. For an increasing 
number of products and services the main feature is not use value or the original 
function but presumed or real ‘feeling’, communicated life-style or status. This 
trend is strikingly present in the dominant advertisements. The exchange of roles 
between essence and form or reality and appearance refers to such deep processes 
that cannot be ignored by the planning theories either.  
The Marxist reaction to these changes could be the following: the changes in the 
world of labour, the development of technology and microelectronics have made it 
possible to aestheticize the development, design, manufacturing, marketing and 
even the use of products. The product itself is often created in the virtual world, on 
a computer. The image we have of our world is also shaped by the media to an 
increasing extent. An ever-growing number of individuals are motivated by the 
post-material value of gratifying their own inclinations. Their goals, choices and 
action strategies are shaped by taste-senses the expected impacts of internal experi-
ences. Homo oeconomicus it replaced by homo aesthetic, the experience subjective 
of our present-day society (Honneth, 1997). These individuals also create social 
groups (of a new type) together with those who have similar attitudes and form 
their habits in the course of interactions within the groups; the lasting desires are 
viewed as values, which can give a certain external orientation. The place of the 
traditional classes and strata is taken over by these new aesthetic or experience 
communities which can function both as subjects and objects of planning. The 
stylistic marks of the individuals and the group are more or less identical, open to 
interpretation. Vision takes the form of life-style orientations. The groups are dif-
ferentiated not so much by profession or origin, but by philosophy of life and eve-
ryday life-style. Besides differences in behaviour, dressing, etc. this complex dis-
position can even lead to territorial segregation. In some cases it is possible to 
identify the geographical areas where patterns of behaviour, taste and experience 
are reproduced.  
After the initial criticism of the above-described phenomena or trend we can 
expect planning to fall in line and serve the ‘new trend’. In addition to categories 
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like efficient, valuable, etc. planners will have to learn how to handle categories 
like beautiful, tasteful, uplifting, satisfactory, etc. Reference points for judgement 
and validation are mainly found in the conventions related to culture, area, place or 
social group – similarly to economics, ethics and aesthetics. Apart from the prob-
lems of elite and mass cultures the judgment of post-material values and experi-
ences depends on the value judgement of specific groups, stratum or group con-
ventions. Considering that the prevailing method used for defining the acceptable 
norms and goals has already become territorial-cultural relativism in which sym-
bols, metaphors and linguistic element play a significant part, the same should be 
used for the handling of aesthetic and ethical hedonism. The plan documents, the 
written words or drawn maps, the conduct of plan reconciliation, the choreography 
of community forums are all tools of transferring emotional intuition. The internal 
architecture, symbolism of the plans is not the only important element; the condi-
tions in which their acceptance is attained play an equally important part. The 
stakeholders need to feel and experience ‘yes, this is my plan, expressing my will’; 
thanks to the technical expertise and intuitive, artistic abilities of the planners the 
work that has been created has an effect on us and we can identify ourselves with 
the roles included in it!  
I do not see any reason why the traditional patterns of planning could not be ap-
plied in the above described environment as well. In this case we should be pre-
pared to handle not only the trivial model of ‘high-brow culture’ but other life-style 
combinations and life orientations as well. In addition to the conventional eco-
nomic performance-orientation or solidarity tasks planning and communication can 
now focus on the development of life-styles, experience goals as well. The usual 
planning communities (municipality, neighbourhood, etc.) can be complemented 
with other life-milieus and these aesthetic or experience communities will become 
the units of planning and legitimation. In the case of the latter only we have to 
reject the assumption of the traditional positive normative content and emphasize 
the instrumental nature of planning. 
Measuring or judging the aesthetic value criteria is rather difficult because nice 
or aesthetic ‘things’ are not similar in a comparable quality and can only be inter-
preted in terms of the individual aesthetic judgments or social conventions. The 
plans and operations built on aesthetic foundations can either prove correct or lead 
us astray, but the formerly described approach to planning that is based on experi-
menting and learning is capable of handling this problem. There seems to be an-
other way open to us as well: we can judge the various aesthetic aspirations exter-
nally, on the basis of the conventional economic or moral criteria, and attempt to 
handle all the difficulties involved in the comparison. Welsch (1997a) has raised 
the point that the criteria of justice and science itself have become aestheticized it 
is therefore not possible to give a critique free of aesthetics. Consequently, the only 
measure of aesthetics-based actions and their results can be only our continuously 
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changing aesthetic sensibility, capable of making corrections, cutting back the 
‘wildings’ of surface aestheticization or even turning into its opposite, as we all 
know.  
In my opinion the fundamental contentions of this theory (paradigm) are the 
following: 
• It is built on the means of procedural rationality which can integrate the vari-
ous types of rationality and aesthetic criteria, or the common (or community) 
norms, values and interactions; 
• The higher the level of community planning, the more it should focus on sys-
temically stabilizing the specific aims of the various social groups and their 
interrelationships; 
• General aestheticizing can change the direction and object of teleological ac-
tions; 
• Universal truth is replaced by the results of the discourses; 
• Planning is not unidirectional any more; there is no single end, ‘goals’ like 
‘unreasonable production’ or aimlessness cannot be excluded; realization of 
utopian ideas, symbols, absurdities; objectification of sensations and ideas; 
• The various types of knowledge do not necessarily constitute a hierarchy; 
• Pluralism of values, goals and plans. Awareness of specificity and partiality; 
• It is not enough to accept the co-existence of the different paradigms, they 
should be taken into account for integration, their contribution cannot be ig-
nored; 
• Teleological action is typical not only of the components of the conventional 
system; it can also express the radical exclusivity of the various specific 
groups/communities.  
6 Theories in planning: methods and styles  
The main criteria I used for this classification is the ‘planning environment’, i.e. the 
operation of the receiving system, the role of planning or planners in governance, 
their place in the power structure, and the way in which power is used. The main 
issue is the extent of the autonomy that individual actors enjoy and of the influence 
that the operation of the society and power has on their thinking (decisions). Is 
there a chance of enforcing communicative power, do the completed plans express 
the free will of the community concerned, and to what extent can the central power 
or economic forces constrain it? The analysis of the legal regulations or the plan-
ning practice is a good starting point for our attempt to answer the above questions 
and additional information can be gained from the exploration of the power games 
that create the justice effects and maintain the operation of power.  
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Planners do not work in isolation, but as parts of a (power) structure defined in 
space and time, according to specific norms and rules in special framework. The 
various types of governance and the ensuing planning systems give citizens differ-
ent opportunities to participate in planning. In some cases citizens’ participation is 
reduced to formal comments (reacting) while in others they are truly expected to 
contribute, make proposals (proposing). 
The borderlines between these planning ‘styles’ often get blurred and we can 
even find examples for the combination of the styles. The choice of the method 
should always depend on the specific task and situation, therefore several ap-
proaches are possible. Even command planning may become necessary e.g. at war-
time, in the case of a disaster, or during the radical transformation of an inefficient 
sub-system.  
6.1 Modern community planning: plan as a means of power 
execution 
According to the classical modern conception planning is able to take a compre-
hensive account of the facts, evaluate them and even rationalize socio-political 
decision-making. Its followers separate theory from practice, referring it back to 
the theory of sciences. Conception development and decision-making (the essence 
of strategy and plan formation) are treated separately form the technical part of 
planning, i.e. from functional planning in the narrow sense as well as implementa-
tion, the persons involved in the implementation and the stakeholders. Planning 
takes place in a hierarchic and bureaucratic power structure – is actually one of its 
sub-systems. Planners are assumed to be neutral as far as values are concerned and 
work for the public interest but – as in all other cases – planners are immanent parts 
of the hierarchic power structure. In a given sector only one plan can be made. 
Outsiders are treated in an instrumentalist way, citizens and actors of the economy 
have nothing to do with the plans before implementation. This type of governance 
and planning system is legitimated by ‘efficient’ operation itself. Planning theory 
focuses on the apology of ‘reality analysis’ and methodology.  
a) Command planning: the plan is everything  
This method is Popper’s ‘utopian planning’ (Popper, 2001) put into practice. It 
usually aims at governing (transforming) the whole society, but outcome is not, but 
the use of rationality but power (coercion). This imperative planning is typical of 
dictatorial systems (e.g. of Soviet or fascist type), it is strongly centralized and the 
institutions constitute a pyramidal model, but it is not the highest level planning 
agency that is at the top of the decision-making pyramid, but a political body, 
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committee or a dictator. This approach is fundamentally interventionist: the plans 
are based on compulsory goals and norms. Insistence on the utopian vision, and 
plans is also typical, therefore learning from the mistakes is out of the question. 
The plans contain specific and detailed operative programmes elaborated by ex-
perts and bureaucrats committed to the prevailing ideology. Both planning and 
implementation is controlled, monitored and sanctioned centrally. Plans are hierar-
chically related to one another and the higher level plans are compulsory for the 
lower levels. The competence of the latter is limited to breaking down the plan, 
which allows only the top-down approach. Planning competences are referred to 
special organizations. Citizens’ participation is reduced to implementation. The 
‘invisible world of politics’ remains the ‘dark side’ for the average citizen. The 
ironic symbols of social participation, the scenery of power execution, political 
demonstrations ‘strengthening’ the central will.  
 b) Corporative planning: reconciliation among corporations 
The identification of the social and technical goals and the underlying value 
choice is performed by a larger bureaucratic system than in the previous type. 
Planning is done at several levels or in several ‘arenas’. Power and planning (deci-
sion-making) is limited to a small number of institutions. Comprehensive, decisive 
goals are centrally defined here as well. The development of the ‘politically effi-
cient’ will is in the hands of the powerful, the administrative elite and the executive 
power. Competences are clearly separated and the organizational system is hierar-
chically articulated. It is important from the viewpoint of power what kind of in-
stitutions emerge besides the government and market organizations and where they 
will find their places within the system. Planning serves directly these organiza-
tions but the plans focus on their goals and interests which are in line with those of 
the central power. Their own partial goals are developed within the institution at 
first, and are later co-ordinated in the course of negotiations, an iterative process. 
Co-operation exists only between the bureaucratic institutions; agreements are the 
results of a power/political game and conflicts of interest are managed according to 
pre-determined rules. Policy development is the part of the planning process during 
which the ends are identified. Bureaucratic expertise the administration play an 
important part in it but the ‘lay’ (democratic) community is ignored by this system 
as well. Outside the government goodies other participants of power enjoy a rela-
tive autonomy in their planning. The sectorial, functional and other priorities are 
defined separately before the results are confronted. Participants often have the 
right to veto negative decisions related to their special field. Participants of plan-
ning (programming) are parts of the power structure and their interest is to main-
tain the prevailing structure. These planners are committed to their employers who 
are also their clients.  
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c) Political planning: the plan is an indication 
This family includes practice-oriented types of planning denoted by different 
names (long-term framework, strategic managements, etc) and applies specific 
methodologies developed mainly for strategic planning (‘design school’, SWOT, 
Harvard policy, portfolio making, modelling decision-making processes, etc.). In 
spite of its rational procedure and sophisticated techniques it is still a normative 
planning with focus on the formulation of goals and strategies, i.e. ‘policy making’. 
Within a clear-cut legal and institutional framework this method allows every-
body to operate in a flexible way. The top level does not develop the traditional 
formal or blue-print type plan but operates a more loosely-knit, decentralized sys-
tem with its procedures. The result is a methodologically founded, well structured 
‘policy making’ which has a co-ordinating function in the long run, while being 
action and result oriented at the same time. Besides developing its own pro-
grammes, this type of planning also seeks to influence or regulate the actions of 
others without making obligatory rules. The top level defines the external context, 
in which the community characterized by plurality of interests operates and elabo-
rates the general rules for the operation of the sub-systems. The lower levels are 
free to make their own programmes provided they respect these general rules. Indi-
rect means are used to influence the actors of the socio-economic life, building on 
the competition among the regulated sub-systems. Direct control and intervention 
is allowed only in a small number of ‘key areas’. The decision-making mechanism 
is well structure. Independent experts can also be granted the competence to make 
plans in addition to the members of the planning bureaucracy. Planners often work 
as advisors as well and can, therefore, participate directly in the development of a 
policy. The completed community strategies reflect the results of the current politi-
cal reconciliations.  
6.2 Pragmatic idealism: let us be democratic and plan directly for 
the people 
All the planning models that belong in this category intend to free planners from 
the one-sided dependence on the prevailing ideology, and assume a pluralist 
planning system where not only the agencies of the state, the local governments 
and their partners are allowed to make plans, but others as well. The application of 
these methods with the right support and regulation (call for proposals) can lead to 
a healthy competition of the various ideas, plans and programmes. This is possible 
mainly in the case of planning made outside the official structure considering that 
national administration allows only one plan at each level and in each sector.  
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Plurality of plans does not mean an equal division of power, but can undoubt-
edly guarantee more democratic conditions for planning than the methods treated 
in the previous section. The planner, relying on his expertise seeks to contribute to 
the solution of problems, consequently becomes the advocate or supporter of the 
completed plans, programmes. His situation is similar to the previous group inas-
much as he is also expected to identify himself with the views and interests of the 
client or groups represented; these interest or ideologies may, however, be quite 
different and it is the planner’s task to identify them, or the interests/values moti-
vating the organization represented. (Davidoff 1965). Although planners often ap-
pear only in the role of ‘external experts’ and act ‘merely’ as moderators, profes-
sional supporters of the process in reality technical planning and the determination 
of goals cannot be separated because the roles of the various actors involved are 
intermingled similarly to values and facts. It is impossible to establish to what ex-
tent the result expresses the will of the stakeholders or whether it is the product of 
the planner’s manipulation (either positive of negative). Planners are often ex-
pected to take an active part in raising citizens’ activity as well. By doing so they 
unquestionably contribute to democratisation, but the forms of ‘community partici-
pation’ used in this case are parts or instruments of the system itself, working for 
its survival. Decision-making and ultimate conception building remains in the 
hands of politicians and bureaucrats (planners). 
a) Planning based on extensive participation: achieving acceptance  
Advocates of this approach seek to involve all the stakeholders in the process of 
planning. This method is applied mainly when implementation is decentralized and 
the success of the programme greatly depends on the commitment of those who 
implement it. Communities, social organizations, actors of the economy, or even 
individuals can participate in the planning process. Participants voluntarily assume 
responsibility for raising the funds and performing the tasks. Planning focuses on 
the negotiations, reconciliations, the exploration and elimination of conflicts. In-
stead being ‘devised’ by the central bureaucracy, the process and structure of plan-
ning is adjusted to the problems and processes in the society.  
The participants themselves usually contribute to the implementation of the 
programmes. The role of the central authorities is limited to transferring informa-
tion and providing technical support. In this case planners are not employed by the 
(central) bureaucracy but work as independent experts choosing their own values 
and committing themselves form time to time. The plans or programmes made with 
this method are integrated in a bottom up way, or get implemented separately, be-
sides the prevailing structure.  
In the late 1970s the method became widespread in England and was put into 
practice as ‘planning for real’ (initiated by Tony Gibson at the University of Not-
tingham). Its followers sought to find social solutions to problems related to the 
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environment and neighbourhoods. They developed various techniques for involv-
ing the population and organizing forums, ranging from the choice locations to the 
arrangement of the chairs, from the processing of maps to the use of coloured paper 
and flags. After these community exercises planners summarize their experiences 
and draw the conclusions, i.e. after a communication procedure the ‘traditional 
instrumental rationality’ works again. 
b) Action planning: focusing on the problem; identification of tasks to be per-
formed then and there 
This type includes mainly local, small-scale planning sensitive to social and 
welfare issues. This method requires the active participation of the stakeholders 
and involves fast implementation. Any particular problem is handles flexibly 
within the context valid only then and there. The key element is the logic of the 
situation – this determines whether the action should be rational or irrational in-
stead of a formerly elaborated or subsequently constructed theory or model. 
Planners have a general technical and psychological knowledge and work ac-
cording to a general framework (e.g. guiding strategic plan, available budget, etc.); 
realizing the need to take action or recognizing a specific problem they empower 
themselves to take initiatives. Planners work in terms of paradigms valid only then 
and there, and usually do innovative planning (that is sometimes quite radical). 
This kind of work is hard to be regulated in advance, because the solutions are 
usually not developed on the basis of standard models. Planners make not only 
plans but decisions as well and also act as catalysts or moderators of the problem 
solving process. This method is similar to trans-active planning with extensive 
participation because is also relies on the participation of stakeholders, the main 
difference being that it is not suitable for planning complex systems, like whole 
cities or regions, since it is used to solve partial problems, often without even 
drawing up a planning document. It is typically used for crisis management, but is 
equally suited for other development projects requiring a radical approach.  
This planning situation is best compared with the case when an organic building 
is erected by local labour using local skills and expertise, and mainly locally pro-
duced materials, without detailed drawings, under the supervision of the architect. 
The specific (partial) solutions are invented on the spot but the architect (works 
manager) who directs the process always bears in mind what the building is meant 
for. Action planning is practicable for the solution of the hygienic and social prob-
lems of slum areas where the traditional methods cannot be used, or for the elimi-
nation of unexpected problems and situations. For example: the planner, commis-
sioned by the local government is granted a budget to ‘humanize’ the area by in-
volving the minority civil organizations and the people living there.  
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6.3 (Post)modern romanticism: ‘let us shape our life together’ 
In Polányi’s view (1992) ‘dynamic order’ is found in a society which allows the 
actors of social life to act at their own discretion and the equilibrium of the society 
is maintained by the mutual alignment of the interacting parties. All this type of 
society and planning attitude expects its members to do is to be committed to the 
universally recognized values. The subsystems, planning units do not seek to find 
generally valid solutions, only those that are rated as best in the given context (at a 
higher level it would be called historical situation) at the particular time. ‘Conven-
tional’ justification is replaced by argumentation and validity is limited to a given 
constellation or time-space relation. Objectivity or even rationality is not necessar-
ily required, a ‘convincing’ solution or good argumentation seem to be sufficient. 
Emphasise has shifted to ethical legitimation issues.  
The methods serving this approach attempt to integrate the planning, decision-
making and operative systems into one organic unit. The individual roles are not 
separated very clearly, because both programming and implementation is seen as a 
common task. Direct participation in decision-making is more important than rep-
resentation. The experiences gained in the course of past events are used and incor-
porated directly into the planning and decision-making process without being fil-
tered by others. By applying these modes of planning we may happen to ‘plan for 
today’ and not for tomorrow, which makes it questionable from a plan dogmatic 
point of view, whether what we do is real planning or not.  
a) Trans-active planning: the mutual learning process 
Trans-active planning represents a transition between ‘pragmatic idealism’ and 
‘(post)modern romanticism’ (Friedmann, 1972) and can be considered as a fore-
runner of communicative and collaborative planning.  
Trans-active planning transforms personal knowledge into new knowledge or 
approach in the course of continuous inter-subjective communication, which has a 
direct impact on activities. This method is most suitable for bridging the communi-
cation gap between the various actors and also for the development of partnerships. 
In the case of institutions the key point is who will actually be involved in the 
processes because the work cannot be successful without competent people. In the 
course of trans-active planning the open-minded the ready-to learn planner puts his 
theoretical knowledge and former experiences into practice while performing a 
systematic technical task. The client contributes to the success of the process with 
his priorities, goals, sense of reality, his experiences about the details of imple-
mentation and by handing over confidential information. This leads to mainly in-
novative and radical planning, because it does not work in the structure required by 
the status quo and usually results in significant changes.  
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b) Planning based on co-operation: communication among individuals and 
their interest groups 
This interactive mode of planning built on continuous discourse is a ‘further de-
veloped’ and theoretically better founded version of the (trans-active) methods 
(based on extensive participation) described in the previous section. The question it 
seeks to answer is the following: How is it possible to reach agreements, develop 
and implement plans without offending the values and interests in our rapidly 
changing world of plural values, where confidence in politics and representative 
democracy is shaken?  
In the course of communicative or collaborative planning discourses are used 
because of their consensus building capacity. During the discourses participants 
can go beyond their biased views and progress towards a rationally motivated 
consensus. It improves the chances of practical application that the jointly realized 
situation analyses and cognitive processes are linked to the given historical context, 
derive from it and have a direct impact on the daily practice.  
The communicative turn exempted planners from having to study and define the 
apparently timely norms and values in an increasingly polarized, multicultural so-
ciety allowing them to become seemingly depoliticalized and get in a similar state 
of grace as in the case of functional planning. The place of surveys, analyses and 
rational decision-making was taken by social maps, consensus tables, discussion 
forums and interviewers’ microphones. ’Facts’ are collected and consensus is built 
with the help of pragmatic logic, language and speech.  
We can only welcome this effort to further extend democracy, it is, however, 
equally important warn about the practical difficulties. It is only through the ‘dis-
tortions’ of the economic and administrative (power) systems that ‘communicative 
brain potential’ can influence practice, that is there are interferences in the commu-
nication process. This method in its pure form cannot operate at all in our present 
‘life world’. The ideal ‘speech situations’ described by Habermas cannot be created 
in a liberal democratic country or in an ‘open society’ presented by Popper either 
because we can never know how accurate, sincere and credible the individual 
manifestations are and consensus can only be created in conditions where instru-
mental rationality is dominant. What we have is guided communication from the 
apparently most democratic ‘public-private partnership’ through the associations 
for town embellishment to the school boards; authoritarianism is always present in 
the debates and – if consensus cannot be reached – decisions are made with major-
ity vote; sometimes those who grab the opportunity given by the freedom of speech 
make it impossible for others to make comments, etc. Politicians can also abuse the 
opportunity of communication and social discourse and – using increasingly so-
phisticated tools – they actually do so. Providing information and training in order 
to make the participants well informed is also a success-oriented transfer of norms. 
The use of direct participation instead of elected bodies often increases the influ-
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ence of uncontrollable cliques and lobby groups. Planners and all the other active 
participants of the planning process must earn their income somewhere; they also 
have racial, regional, cultural, professional, etc. identities, therefore their normative 
(political) neutrality is questionable. Enforcing interests is the main motivation for 
participation in the planning process.  
Those who adapt Habermas’s views often forget – or deliberately conceal – the 
point that Habermas always requires the simultaneous fulfilment of several strict 
conditions for the development of the desirable consensus and validity of his argu-
ments, consequently the consensus built in this way can only be valid for the given 
point in time. The pragmatist adaptation of communicative ethics is a kind of new, 
naïve idealism that cannot be supposed ex ante to bring different results than the 
other forms of modern planning. Notwithstanding I believe that there is nothing 
wrong with the goal, we should make every effort to realize open and extensive 
communication with all those concerned to attain the ‘winner-winner’ state, which 
often goes together with the conflict of interests and the enforcement of a particular 
one. This undoubtedly furthers democratization. It should be made clear, however, 
that even if we proceed in this way, we can never be sure how close or far we have 
got to or from the truth or to what degree we actually serve public interests.  
Post-modern thinkers (e.g. Lyotard, 1993) also warn that consensus is at best 
the horizon beyond our reach and in the pragmatism of scientific life the emphasis 
should be on opposing views. Consensus can be created artificially by methods 
which can make individuals want what the capacity of the system requires. In this 
case, however, we have hardly moved away from the first type of planning. More 
sophisticated procedures (like ‘learning,’ or the media) can produce the same re-
sults as brute coercion or the breakdown of the plans. The only consolation is that 
the rule of context is better than the lack of its influence.  
7 Classification by interpretations of planner’s role 
The different situations and tasks require different planner attitudes, theoretical 
(normative) approaches and actions (role play) in agreement with the former. In a 
well-established democracy or a successfully operating institution/company ‘there 
is no need’ to change the fundamental goals and the existing structure; planning is 
used as an operative tool mainly for allocation and regulation purposes in order to 
efficiently implement the accepted and well proven normative will. In this case the 
planner acts as the loyal technocrat of implementation who never ventures on the 
marshland of transcending. Besides maintaining the general framework, the basic 
structure and continuity, there is also room for evolutionary development. In order 
to improve the operation of the system the planner is free to propose institutional 
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development or reallocation of resources within the limits of the Hegelian concept 
of freedom. This ‘maintenance’ type thinking together with the continuous im-
provement of successful operation and efficiency contributes to the choices of val-
ues, decisions and ultimately to the legitimating of power (leaders, decision-
makers). A completely different, radical planner attitude or revolution becomes 
necessary when serious troubles are experienced in the whole system or an easily 
separable part of it and a new structure needs to be developed in the wake of new 
value choices and goals. An ‘epistemological divide’ or discontinuity is indispen-
sable for a new development to begin.  
In these operative situations various combinations of the formerly discussed 
theories of planning and theories in planning are possible and applicable. In this 
chapter I characterize and classify the various planner roles distinguishing them 
from the political decision-makers in order to see how they are related to the pre-
vailing system or structure and to what extent they can influence the normative 
value choices.  
It is not unusual that processes requiring different planning attitudes (the inter-
est groups behind them) get into conflict with each other. For example, the alloca-
tive approach of traditional planners may clash with those who favour development 
and changes, especially if the latter aim at fundamental structural changes. At the 
same time it would be a mistake to oppose any one of the approaches with the oth-
ers proclaiming it to be progressive, or positive, because all of them may become 
necessary and in specific cases they are not interchangeable.  
The relationship with the external structure is also related to the condition of the 
inner system of planning and the constraint to change it. Allocative planning does 
not usually require any changes in the inner circle of planning. The learning proc-
ess of innovative planning may, however, require inner modifications. The radical 
approach generally leads to the development of a new planning structure.  
When writing this chapter, I extensively drew on the works by professor John 
Friedman (Friedmann, 1964, 1987, 1988). 
7.1 Allocative (functional) planning 
In the conditions of functional planning (see chapter 6) the planner assumes the 
normative (political) environment, the externally set goals and priorities to be 
granted and unquestionable. In most of the cases his task is to allocate the re-
sources available (funds, land, raw material, market, labour, etc.) among the com-
peting development needs or users and to perform a concrete task according to a 
specific goal. This is the traditional function of planning and is still its most fre-
quently used form (e.g. financial planning and physical planning are built on this 
logic). It is based on the existing institutions, previously valid norms (e.g. partial 
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economic efficiency) and the accepted experiences, does not create fundamentally 
new knowledge. Within the framework of the existing system or (power) structure 
it seeks to find the most efficient or equitable solution; one that can maintain equi-
librium and ‘social peace’. Decision-makers provide planners with goals and pri-
orities and the planners make proposals for the concrete tasks with regard to the 
given limits. A typical example for allocative planning could be the planning of the 
budget, physical planning (regulation of land/area use) and central sectorial plan-
ning in general.  
The main characteristics of allocative planning are the following (see also the 
chapter on functional planning!): 
• It operates within a strict framework defined by politics and law, in the exist-
ing structure; 
• The autonomy of planners is minimal; 
• Functional rationality: it is based on the modernist assumption that rational 
decisions can be made in the conditions of limited access to information and 
it is possible to separate the deliberate value choices made by the decision-
makers and rationality used in the course of planning because they are inde-
pendent from each other. Working within the given limits and relying on sci-
entific findings, planners act rationally while decision-makers represent the 
‘common good’ in a representative democracy. Planners treat the given basic 
situation in a deterministic way as a sociological (quasi-objective) fact; 
• Limited complexity: nothing should escape the planner’s attention within the 
well-defined scope of the task; 
• Allocating/dividing character: the object of planning is divided among the 
given actors, tasks and functions; prioritizing of tasks, scheduling; 
• Equilibrium and optimization: maintaining or redressing the balance of the 
various components of the system;  
• Quantitative approach: measurability is important; the proposed solutions 
should be tested on various models in the course of planning (input-output, 
simulation, linear and dynamic programming and other models); 
• Limited time horizon: since goals and priorities are supposed to be unchange-
able, plans can lose their validity rather quickly in our rapidly changing 
world. This mode of planning is best used for short and perhaps medium 
term. In spite of this, it is often applied to particularize long-term objectives.  
• Periodicity and easy formalization: the various periods and responsibilities 
are easily separated and identified and can, therefore, be institutionalized and 
operated individually as well, 
• Easy to regulate: both the content and the procedure, and in practice it oper-
ates within the framework of legal regulations; 
• It is justified on the basis of means-end rationality. 
 72 
7.2 Innovative (development oriented) planning 
Progress and true problem solving require an innovative, development-oriented 
approach. In such cases planners should not accept the formerly defined goals and 
operative framework without criticism, but should make efforts to change them. In 
contrast with the allocative mode, innovative planning does not focus so much on 
the distribution of the resources originating from the prevailing trends, but on fos-
tering development, transcending the present. In the search for innovative solutions 
it does not go beyond the limits of the accepted paradigm or narratives. This way of 
thinking cannot remain within the limits of functional planning because it requires 
comprehensive, rational planning or rather a strategic approach/planning. In order 
to have the new innovations accepted proposals should be in line with the progres-
sive trends within the transformation of social norms; the whole administrative 
(power) system should represent a uniform philosophy and obtain the support of 
politicians.  
Here is a list of the main features of innovative planning – with the specific 
elements highlighted: 
• Political or general regulation: the creativity of planners is restricted only by 
the comprehensive norms, political trends. They are free to propose solutions 
of their own within the main framework of the plan. Decision-makers (politi-
cians) keep their controlling role acting as a kind of clutch between planners’ 
proposals and implementation. The ultimate responsibility rests with the de-
cision-maker;  
• Development orientation: elaboration of developments and innovations 
within the existing structure; 
• Priority to quality: in addition to quantitative changes/distribution the quality 
and character of the factors have also gained importance; 
• Changing the institutional system: the new values and proposals usually re-
quire a new division of functions and competences, i. e. new institutions 
(people) become necessary; 
• Action orientation: goals and their implementation are united inseparably, 
which occasionally makes it necessary for the planners to have a greater in-
fluence on the decisions and implementation; 
• Resource mobilization: the planner functions as an ‘entrepreneur’ when he 
ferrets out resources for the new tasks and institutions or offers innovative 
forms of implementation. Decision-makers will not accept entirely new solu-
tions unless it is made absolutely clear to them who is going to do what and 
how it will be financed. The problem here is not the allocation of the avail-
able (granted) resources as in the case of allocative planning; 
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• Entrepreneurial skills, sensibility to innovation, creativity and intuition have 
significantly more importance than knowing the inventory of assumed real-
ity; 
• Continuously cyclical process. The planner does not need to wait for external 
authorization; he has the right to make initiatives; 
• Innovative planning cannot be regulated on the content side; it is only the 
procedure and the form that represent some kind of constraint.  
7.3 Radical planning 
In his work entitled ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ Marx writes that philosophers have 
merely given different interpretations of the world, but our task is to change it. This 
could serve as the ars poetica of radical planning. (The term radical planning was 
first used by J. Friedmann. A similar mode of planning is described by T. Sager 
(1993) as ‘recalcitrant’). It is a well established fact that we cannot go back from a 
deep (structural) crisis to the condition that preceded it, i.e. reproduce any former 
state; radical changes are needed during which something new (mutant) is created 
driving form new hypotheses and a different knowledge. Crises are important be-
cause they indicate that time has come to replace our prevailing concepts. The ‘or-
dinary individuals of world history’ have to undertake the initiative for the change 
of social norms and structure lining up the citizens behind the projects that contrib-
ute to social transformation.  
In order to recognize the opportunity for a different kind of development and 
decide its orientations we have to abstract form conventional knowledge, the utili-
zation of the resources and the organizations created for it as well as the results of 
the process. Transcendence, teleological thinking and action can help us go beyond 
the given (social) practice, but we should bear in mind the limitations of such a 
‘take-off’. The ‘opportunities’ should be within the competence of the society in 
question; they should be identical with the decisive goals of practice. Radical ideas, 
the new order/structure or practice can become widespread if they are extensively 
accepted as better suited for the implicit ends and can improve operation.  
Radical planning is a series of actions which – opposing the dominant trends 
and operational mechanisms of the prevailing order/structure – initiates funda-
mental (structural) changes on the basis of new knowledge thereby transforming 
the character of the former processes. It can create new structures and operations 
which do not continue the prevailing trends, but trigger a new development spiral.  
Radical planning requires the merger of plan making, decision-making and im-
plementation. The planner is the member of an action team. Radical planning is 
independent of the decision-making mechanism of the existing power structure. His 
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initially loose relationship with the scientific and lay groups has already become 
well structured. The planner (team) has to fend for himself acting both as pro-
grammer and implementer, raising the resources and utilizing them in an effort to 
extend his own power and increase his influence. Initially processes are realized 
outside the official (government) sphere or planning mechanism. In this case the 
client is quite obviously not the state or an ‘external body’ but the mobilised group 
that has taken the initiative. The project consists in the transformation of the exist-
ing order or one of its sub-systems.  
The characteristics of radical planning are the following: 
• Planner autonomy; 
• Refusal of loyalty, withdrawal, protest; 
• Based on the transformative theory and new knowledge (orientation), rejec-
tion of prevailing paradigms and narratives; 
• Self-empowerment and self-management; 
• Thinking without limitations or borders; 
• Network building, development of relations (creating the right conditions); 
• Dialogues, mutual learning process; 
• Activity. 
The process of radical planning: 
• Criticism of the ‘existing order’ the given practice (or established customs); 
• Creation of new knowledge, elaboration of an alternative proposal 
(‘transcending’); 
• Development of action strategy and tactics; 
• Dissemination of ‘information’, finding allies; 
• Clash/Conflict with the existing order and institutions; 
• Expansion in the case of success.  
This mode of planning is not regarded as ‘classical community’ planning al-
though it can also be linked to groups or interest groups. Control and internal 
learning process lend themselves to interpretation and operate in this case, too. If 
successful, it is justified by the changes in the targeted norms and structures and 
their acceptance.  
Radical planning is rooted in the utopian, anarchist and Marxist traditions. 
Radical planning is voluntarist by nature. Mannheim’s utopian ‘militant democ-
racy, planned communization based on the ‘terrorism of honesty are also specific 
manifestations of this radical planning. By integrating political science and plan-
ning into administration Mannheim wanted to introduce the rule of knowledge into 
practice in order to avoid dictatorial extremities.  
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Radical planning is present in well established democracies as well (e.g. the 
anti-globalization movement), but usually ranges over small parts of the socio-
economic existence only. Action-oriented social movements can be cited as the 
most frequent examples. Several socio-political movements and alternative 
economic endeavours could also be listed here such as the co-operative movement 
under capitalism, the introduction of special economic zones in communist China, 
various feminist, homosexual, lesbian and green movements, etc. 
8. Integrated community (spatial) planning 
8.1 The specificity of spatial planning does not derive from its 
spatial character 
Our view of space is determined by a particular duality: on the one hand, space is a 
pure way of looking at things, a conceptual construct and independent of the ob-
jects around us; on the other hand, it is the sine qua non, the form and framework 
of everything that exists; on the one hand it is seen as an abstract view or a priori 
notion, on the other hand as a practical construction consisting of concrete (‘ob-
jective’) experience elements. Space is a source of cognition that objects consist of 
among others, but it does not determine them in their material reality giving them 
only their possible forms. 
Space in itself is an unfathomable, imperceptible, homogeneous empty form of 
uniform ‘density’ in which phenomena get or are arranged. Empty space does not 
get structured, the space of non-existence has no central points, around which phe-
nomena organize themselves or can be organized. This empty space offers the pos-
sibility or condition of filling it and defines the form of everything that exists; it is 
here that the different structures are built.  
Human actions are not structured by space that is independent of us and con-
stant in time; it is people with spatial relations developed according to their per-
ception of space and their objectifications who create spatial structure. Spatial 
structures are thus created from the system of relationships created by use of space 
and are continuously transformed following changes in our perception of space.  
Our a priori perception of space changes over time. Earlier the sensations con-
nected to our experiences played the key role but today we are capable of abstract-
ing form these. The view we have of space in everyday life is mainly determined 
by the experimental geographical space, its use, the related notions as linguistic 
tools, and the preliminary knowledge which provides a spatial interpretation of 
phenomena and in which – as pre-assumption – the various spatial interrelation-
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ships governing the special organization of our actions are constituted. Objective 
reality, which partially fills up space and exists independently of our conscious-
ness, is arranged according to its ‘own logic’ (e.g. physical laws). However, the 
description and interpretation of how the noumena get ‘structured’ or how animals 
behave in space mean a reconstruction in accordance with our a priori perception 
of space.  
Space is one dimension of our daily life, time is the other. Every change, (e.g. 
movement) is possible only if it takes place in both of these dimensions; something 
can become a part of reality by filling (occupying/expropriating) space and time. A 
general (universal) statement cannot become true unless the space-time coordi-
nates are given. If the spatial/territorial (mathematical/logical/geographical) coor-
dinates of an existing or imaginary thing are given it will be assigned a place in 
space and thereby it will gain additional content besides itself. The interaction of 
the elements and their combinations has a different meaning in a concrete space 
from the elements of the material world taken individually. 
Post-structuralists and post moderns (e.g. Derrida, Lyotard and Thom) do not 
accept the traditional interpretation of space but consider it to be a political-practi-
cal construction. They find it meaningful only as a living space and not as an 
autonomous domain, independent of subjective perception. Space is not impersonal 
but an interpreted category. Those who emphasize the role of language, the lan-
guage a priori (e.g. Wittgenstein, Searle) warn that language use is not limited to a 
mere description of the facts and the use of notions related to space also shape not 
only space but territorial institutions and future use of space as well. 
Consequently the living space that we have is basically a human construction, 
consisting of objects (things), acts (actions) and social facts. Its transformation is 
influenced not only by our constantly changing a priori space perception but also 
by the way in which we think or speak about it; how we share our knowledge with 
others, how we intend to organize our life in different structures and whether we 
can have this intention accepted by others.  
Apprehensible and analysable space is a network of the relationship between 
human relations and spatial elements. The phenomena existing side by side (in 
space) create various arrangements or spatial structures determined by their spatial 
relations and connections. The phenomena include recognizable and generalizable 
spatial regularities as well as territorial differences. As time passes, the objects, 
instruments, institutions created by human activity and their structures can separate 
from their use and the activities that created them and become ‘external potentiali-
ties’ that we had better adapt ourselves to and count on when the new activities are 
being planned. With the demand for the original use ceasing the individual objecti-
fications can take up a new meaning and allow a new kind of use. We can build 
virtual customs borders and pull them down, or a building as a physical framework 
may have many different uses.  
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Looking for the essential features of spatial planning we come to the people 
living in the territory concerned and their communities, i.e. community planning. 
This emphasis on territoriality means the ideation of the inevitable interaction and 
interdependence deriving from co-existence. Similarly to the concrete space that 
integrates the socio-economic events and establishes a particular relationship 
among the actors, spatial and community approaches are inevitably of interdisci-
plinary and integrative character.  
8.2 Integration of different planning types by spatial/community 
levels 
The regionally-culturally defined population groups are both the subjects and ob-
jects of the socio-economic programmes and actions. In practice, planners work in 
isolation within the given community, level of planning or unit due to various 
practical and institutional considerations. The more fragmented the approaches, the 
stronger the need to handle them together.  
Integration, the need to co-operate have become widely accepted by now, but it 
still has not been properly understood that besides the time dimension space also 
has an important role in community planning and therefore all planning is spatial. 
Consequently, in the case of spatial planning the adjective is not meant to express 
the distinction that planning is applied to a given component of space or the actions 
proposed are realized in a concrete space, but something else. One the one hand, 
the adjective ‘spatial’ may become necessary when we intend to distinguish plan-
ning from other kinds of plan which have different priorities and consider spatial 
character of secondary importance only. On the other hand – and this is a lot more 
important – when planning reflects the will of a specific unit of space (settlement, 
county, region, country, etc.) and the knowledge and norms of the population living 
on a separate territory and deeply related to it (territorial identity) constitute the 
complex frame of reference for planning instead of an external will or some partial 
professional criteria. Decentralization, subsidiarity and partnership are all princi-
ples used in both the organization of society and planning that strengthen planning 
linked to various social, economic, discourse, etc. spaces.  
In the practice the spatial approach always becomes more important because 
particularization of the general values and legitimation of our statements can take 
place in a specific space and time only as well as every action or intervention is 
performed in a concrete space. In the course of planning individual predictions are 
deduced from general knowledge and sooner or later we have to define the space 
and time coordinates of the intended operations. Each particular statement involves 
the identification of space and time in addition to the other parameters. Specifica-
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tion of place usually means choosing from the geometrical space categories. Indi-
vidual designations imply classification into a more general space category (class, 
subclass, territorial level, settlement group, or territorial category).  
Traditional sectors insist on planning independently and spatial planning also 
continues fighting for an integrating role. Initially this would mean highlighting the 
specific character of the spatial approach and establishing the independent institu-
tions, while space-conscious thinking becomes a more and more important part of 
functional and sectorial planning. Development is expected to launch a new type of 
social rationalization process, in which space is again the form of every phenome-
non and the possible framework of all thoughts. This, however requires us to treat 
form and content together and consider spatial structure to be a form in which 
contend operates or manifests itself.  
Every development operation has an adequate spatial dimension as well as an 
artificial sectorial nature in line with the division of labour prevailing in the age 
concerned. These two factors represent two inseparable aspects of the same thing. 
In contrast with it, however, decisions on development projects are dominated by 
sectorial viewpoints which may not only interfere with territorial interests, but sig-
nificantly impair the efficiency of implementation as well. In the background of 
these sectorial viewpoints we often find efforts for centralization which are in con-
flict with decentralization associated with the territorial principle.  
 Practically all interventions proposed in the plan documents (specific actions or 
measures) belong to one sector or another and vice versa: the localization or territo-
rial embedding of the sectorial developments is of key importance, it is therefore 
imperative to ensure co-operation between territorial and sectorial experts. The 
determination of the spatial dimension of sectorial development or a territorial 
breakdown (into regions, counties, small regions, etc) in itself does not mean that 
the spatial approach has been asserted.  
 For several decades territorial development was dominated by physical 
planning focusing on the development of the physical environment and the man-
agement of regulation of land use. Physical planners follow the principles of long-
term comprehensive and rational theory of planning. They have a peculiar inter-
pretation for functional rationality: in order to create the illusion of ‘objectivity and 
professionalism’ they pretend to rely on the natural and built environment in their 
value choices. Professional forums and plan reconciliations are also used to get the 
mostly ‘professional criteria’ accepted. Physical planners make incrementalist-
strategic plans partly in order to meet the EU requirements. Developers emphasize 
the accelerated learning process and renew their plans in the medium run. Devel-
opment planning is primarily innovative (perhaps radical), therefore change is put 
into the focal point while physical planning is ab ovo allocative, covers long peri-
ods of time and makes the preservation of the built environment a priority.  
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Physical planning is deeply influenced by natural philosophy (natural law). It 
builds on the view that there are principles, natural laws and conditions beyond 
people’s control which, however, determine their life and set limitations to their 
actions. The application of the laisser faire evolutionary principle of natural phi-
losophy opposes the assertion of human will to the laws of nature. Physical plan-
ning, based on the naïve philosophy of natural law and geographical determinism, 
has been widely criticised for the following: 
• It erroneously confuses causality with teleology; 
• Physical planners often empower themselves to act as the medium of nature; 
• Referring to the laws of nature they often present their normative proposals 
as objective necessity; 
• Statements related to the physical environment and experiments are superim-
posed on normative statements; 
• It refers value choices to the competence of professional decision-makers; 
• The ecological principle that physical planners so often emphasize is not the 
ultimate goal, but a principle to be applied continuously in the course of ra-
tionalization. 
Followers of the French possibilists (Paul Vidal de la Blache, Lucien Febvre) 
took an important step forward when they broke with the traditional geographical 
and historical determinism. They think that people who shape history – including 
planners as well – can choose from a range of opportunities offered by nature. 
These choices reflect the specific features of their way of life and are also influ-
enced by the historical situation. The decisions of the subjective individual are 
deduced exclusively from the past and the present milieus. This is an important 
step towards transcending traditional determinism, yet they do not reckon with the 
possibility of transcendental teleology, a utopian way of thinking in the best sense 
of the term.  
Physical planning in itself is not an independent planning cycle, learning-
controlling circle, but it is part of a uniform planning process; it does not postulate 
new goals of its own and answers only questions of where and how, leaving others, 
like when, from what sources, by whom, etc. unanswered. 
Development and physical planning are parts of a uniform planning process in 
which the regulations and procedures of land use constitute a well distinguished 
sub-system. Development and physical planning should start from a uniform 
analysis of the situation and conception building, the identification of the goals and 
the elaboration of the strategy should also be joint efforts. At first the identification 
of goals happens at the moral level with the definition of universal, general norms 
that are acceptable for everybody. Then we have to answer some ethical-political 
questions in order to decide what is good for us, a territorially separate social 
group. The choice of the most adequate means is the outcome of pragmatic techni-
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cal discussions. It is the first steps that require the greatest publicity and the widest 
participation. Later on efforts should be made to involve the stakeholders and when 
it comes to choosing the means it is sufficient to involve experts only.  
The requirement of a uniform conception building process at all levels of a 
given institute (e.g. government, local government) does not mean that the various 
actors (e.g. at government level the ministries or sectors) cannot contribute their 
own proposals to the formulation of the integrated common will; they are, however 
not supposed to develop a conception of their own, and build their own action plan 
on it. The various sectorial, inter-sectorial and functional programmes and physical 
plans should be integrated in s uniform planning system. The functional and hori-
zontal relationships can operate within this framework.  
Physical – type thinking (planning) is required for the definition of the con-
straints, the accepted (undertaken) determinations, the regulation of the develop-
ment programmes in line with them, and the technical designing of land use for the 
accepted development proposals. The specific (sectorial, functional and territorial) 
programmes (plans) and measures will be elaborated in line with the strategic 
resolutions and with regard to the opportunities and rules of physical planning. 
This desirable process is illustrated in Figure 4.  
The part above the first dotted line is analytical work phase in the traditional 
terminology. It is in this phase that the various time planes meet, the lessons 
learned from the past and present are compared with our desires and the external 
opportunities. In the area between the two dotted lines will is made explicit, and 
new knowledge is created (synthesizing, conception building, paradigm formation); 
an important element of this work is the wording of the determinations undertaken 
and other constrains in normative regulations and their acceptance, i.e. physical 
planning. In the next part the separately planned (sectorial and functional) pro-
grammes and action plans can be elaborated in line with the uniform strategy, the 
accepted rules of physical planning and the special rational criteria, following the 
principles of functional planning. Consequently it is in this phase of planning that 
sectorial (partial) thinking can appear on its own and assert its own specific ration-
ality of means within the above defined framework.  
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Figure 4 
Integrated (public/spatial) planning process 
 
Source: Author’s. 
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